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HIDDEN TAXES 
BRIAN GALLE

 
ABSTRACT 
The idea of hidden taxes is as old as John Stuart Mill, but convincing 
evidence of their existence is new. In this Article, I survey and critique 
recent studies that claim to show that there are some taxes that can go 
unnoticed by those who pay them. I also develop the array of unanswered 
theoretical questions and policy implications that potentially follow from 
the studies’ results.  
Probably the central question for hidden taxes is whether they might 
enable government to raise revenue without also distorting the economy. If 
so, I argue, they have the potential to radically refashion the architecture 
of redistributive government. But, as I also show, whether that is true 
turns on the cognitive mechanisms that might permit taxes to go 
unnoticed. For example, if hidden taxes are caused not by rational 
ignorance but by cognitive shortcomings, then it is likely that the burden 
of a hidden tax will be borne disproportionately by poorer taxpayers, and 
vice-versa. Thus, I attempt to integrate with the tax literature some recent 
developments in our understanding of bounded rationality in consumers 
more generally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a price to be paid for justice, if conventional economic 
descriptions of taxation are true. In these accounts, fairness and welfare 
compete: we can redistribute wealth from rich to poor, but only by making 
society as a whole worse off.
1
 Similarly, it is often said that local 
governments should not, and typically cannot, redistribute wealth, because 
those from whom wealth is taken will flee to less generous locales.
2
 Both 
 
 
 1. ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975); Joseph Bankman & 
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. 
L. REV. 1905, 1919–21 (1987); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 430 (1952); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System 
Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 680–81 
(1994). 
 2. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1631–38 (2000); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The 
New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 
GEO. L.J. 201, 212, 246 (1997); Charles C. Brown & Wallace E. Oates, Assistance to the Poor in a 
Federal System, 32 J. PUB. ECON. 307, 328 (1987); Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol87/iss1/2
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of these accounts depend on the assumption, long thought uncontroversial, 
that taxes change people’s behavior.3 Yet, as this Article surveys, there is 
startling new evidence that in some cases taxes do not change behavior at 
all. Taxes can be ―hidden,‖ so that they collect revenue or redistribute 
wealth without also affecting decisions about whether or where to earn or 
spend. There are many uncertainties that attend this new field, as I also 
discuss here. But, depending on what future research reveals, we may need 
to revisit some basic assumptions of tax policy—as well as of public 
finance economics—more generally. 
The fairness-welfare tradeoff follows from the basic economic 
assumption that in well-functioning markets the choices made by market 
participants maximize each person’s subjective welfare.4 In order to fund 
any government program, including one that furthers some redistributive 
goal, society must raise revenue, usually through some form of tax. These 
taxes change the price of the goods that are exchanged in the market, 
altering consumers’ decisions. In some instances, where markets are 
themselves inefficient, taxes may deflect consumer choice closer to the 
ideal point. But in the absence of externalities or other market failures, the 
imposition of a tax that changes taxpayer behavior will reduce overall 
societal welfare.  
Thus, the ideal tax is the one that least affects the behavior of actors in 
efficient markets.
5
 Indeed, there is a tradition in public finance economics, 
usually associated with Ramsey and Mirrlees, arguing that the most 
efficient tax is one imposed on ―inelastic‖ behavior—behavior that is 
relatively insensitive to price.
6
  
 
 
Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA 
L. REV. 1389, 1408–10 (2004). But cf. Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State 
and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 478–80 (1996) (arguing that 
some localities might have wealthy taxpayers with taste for redistribution). 
 3. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 1909. 
 4. For a more detailed explanation of these points, see infra Part I.  
 5. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 279 (5th ed. 1989). 
 6. J. A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 175, 175–208 (1971). For a handful of fine overviews, see Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of 
Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 61, 61–127 (Alan J. 
Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985); Bankman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 1945–58; Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK 
OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 991, 1023–37 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987). To the extent 
that this welfare-maximizing tax has undesirable distributive consequences—such as by imposing a 
heavy tax on food, medicine, and other necessaries—its effects can perhaps be unwound with 
government grants. Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Redistribution: Some Clarifications, 60 TAX L. REV. 
57, 70–73 (2007). Additionally, a societal preference for certain distributions can be reflected in 
Wash U Law Repository
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At the risk of making my argument here seem obvious, my claim in 
this Article hinges on the observation that, in order for a tax to induce 
behavioral changes from the taxpayer, the taxpayer must usually first be 
aware of the tax. Similarly, if the size of the behavioral distortion is related 
to the size of the tax bill, then a diminished awareness of the bill’s 
economic burdens should also diminish the distortion. It follows that an 
unnoticed tax is, like a tax on highly inelastic behaviors, potentially more 
efficient than more obvious excises.  
These points are academic if taxpayers are perfectly rational and 
possessed of full information about their own finances. However, a 
growing literature, both in and outside the laboratory, suggests that, in 
fact, taxpayers exhibit different responses to taxes that are more or less 
―salient‖—that is, noticeable or easy to process.7 This is an old idea, but 
evidence in support of it is new.
8
 For example, Amy Finkelstein reports 
that drivers are less sensitive to toll increases when tolls are debited 
electronically rather than paid in cash.
9
 Similarly, Chetty, Looney, and 
Kroft find that shoppers are more responsive to sales taxes when those 
taxes are posted on the shelf, rather than computed at the register.
10
 In this 
paper, I describe any of these tax designs, in which the behavioral effects 
of the tax are less than predicted by classic economic theory, as a ―hidden‖ 
tax.
11
  
 
 
computation of the social welfare function, leading to a balancing between progressivity and 
neutrality. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 1950–55.  
 7. My definition of ―salient‖ taxes follows that in the existing literature. Edward J. McCaffery 
& Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect of Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. BEHAV. 
DECISION MAKING 289, 289 (2006).  
 8. See Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in 
TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RUSSELL MATTHEWS 65, 65 (1988) 
(tracing idea to early-20th century Italian economists); Isaac Martin & Nadav Gabay, Do Visible 
Taxes Cause Protest? Tax Policy and Tax Protest in Rich Democracies 2, 5 (Sept. 7, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_ 
citation/1/8/2/8/9/p182898_index.html) (describing history of ―visibility hypothesis‖ as dating to John 
Stuart Mill).  
 9. Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates 4 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=964887).  
 10. Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 13330, 2007). 
 11. Thus, my usage of the term in this technical sense should be distinguished from earlier 
mentions in the literature, which tend to use the phrase to refer either to the political salience of a tax 
or more generally simply to describe costs that other commentators have not acknowledged. E.g., 
Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 
332 (1995); George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, “We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard 
Way”: Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 199 (2006); Edward 
J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1874–86 (1994); Beverly Moran, 
Income Tax Rhetoric (Or Why Do We Want Tax Reform?), 1992 WIS. L. REV. 2063, 2066 (1992); 
Rebecca S. Rudnick, State and Local Taxes on Nonprofit Organizations, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 323 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol87/iss1/2
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My aim here is to explore the implications of hidden taxes for public 
policy. It is possible that hidden taxes could revolutionize the design of 
some government programs. For example, shifting to hidden taxes might 
permit society to redistribute considerably more wealth to the poor while 
holding the deadweight losses of tax constant, or, conversely, hold 
redistribution constant while growing the economy. The relative salience 
of taxes versus other forms of redistribution, such as regulation, should 
inform our choice of redistributive instrument. And hidden taxes could 
alter the conclusion of many pure tax policy questions, such as the choice 
whether to stimulate the economy through rebate checks rather than 
reduced payroll withholding, whether to redistribute income locally or 
nationally, or the choice between sales tax and Value-Added Tax.  
I argue, though, that all these outcomes depend on a number of 
antecedent questions, many of which have not yet even been considered in 
the literature. Perhaps most importantly, existing models of hidden tax 
assume what might be termed a rational ignorance or ―intentional‖ model 
of tax salience. That is, the models assume that taxpayers neglect taxes as 
a result of a calculated determination that the disutility of calculating tax 
exceeds the present discounted value of avoiding the tax.
12
 However, other 
contributions to the behavioral economics literature imply that there are 
alternative explanations, in which individuals are not capable of taking 
into account the real future utility cost of present decisions.
13
 I term these 
other theories collectively the ―unintentional ignorance‖ model.14  
 
 
(1993); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation and the Tenth Amendment: On 
Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1336 (1993) (finding the 
―unfunded mandate phenomenon . . . understandable in public choice terms as a form of hidden 
taxation imposed by poorly monitored, opportunistic legislators‖) (emphasis added). Prior usages that 
appear similar to mine include Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us 
Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 235 (1996); Nancy C. Staudt, 
Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REV. 555, 589–90 (2002). 
 12. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 28–30. These models are part of a literature that, while 
emphasizing the rational choice component of taxpayers’ decisions, departs from classical economic 
thought in positing that individuals’ reasoning and deliberation are costly. Probably the definitive early 
work is Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955); see also 
Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Thinking Ahead: The Decision Problem 1–3 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W11867, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=872723; see Brian E. Dollery & Andrew C. Worthington, The Empirical 
Analysis of Fiscal Illusion, 10 J. ECON. SURVEYS 261, 264 (1996); Wallace E. Oates, ―Automatic” 
Increases in Tax Revenues—The Effect on the Size of the Public Budget, in FINANCING THE NEW 
FEDERALISM: REVENUE SHARING CONDITIONAL GRANTS, AND TAXATION 143 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 
1975). 
 13. See Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An Economic 
Approach, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 137, 138 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carillo 
eds., 2003); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449–70 (2003); Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence 
Wash U Law Repository
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As I show here for the first time in the literature, the policy 
implications of hidden taxes differ radically depending on whether the 
intentional or unintentional model is more accurate. Under the intentional 
model, taxes will not remain hidden when the tax bill becomes large, 
because the benefits of avoiding the tax will eventually exceed the benefits 
of avoiding having to think about tax. In that case, hidden taxes are 
probably not a solution to the fairness-welfare tradeoff, because they 
cannot raise enough revenue. In addition, depending on which model 
ultimately prevails, hiding a tax may change who pays the tax. Hidden 
taxes are likely progressive in a rational ignorance model, but regressive 
otherwise.  
Additional possible qualifications to the hidden tax story have been 
recognized by other scholars, but not explored in any great depth.
15
 Thus, 
another contribution of this Article is to examine in close focus the 
possibility that taxpayers might anticipate hidden taxes or that learning 
and experience might over time increase the salience of the hidden tax. In 
addition, I want to highlight the fiscal federalism aspects of the problem, 
which thus far also have not been addressed by the literature. Changes in 
the salience of a tax may affect Tiebout sorting—that is, the choice of 
which bundle of local taxes and government services we wish to 
consume.
16
 That possibility implies that hidden taxes might best be 
employed, if anywhere, at the national level.  
Finally, I point out that the new findings that hidden taxes change 
consumer behavior distinguish these developments from what has come 
before. The long-standing view of hidden taxes focused solely on their 
political implications, in particular the possibility that low salience may 
also present opportunities for self-serving tax increases by public officials, 
 
 
from the Field 1–52 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13420, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014797. 
 14. I choose the term ―unintentional ignorance‖ rather than ―irrational‖ because only some of 
these alternatives depend on individuals who are actually irrational; others depend on lack of full 
information. See infra text accompanying notes 55–58. All of them, however, have in common the 
assumption that when a person fails to take account of tax, he or she has not made an explicit choice to 
ignore the tax.  
 15. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 36–47; Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 35–36; Amy Finkelstein, 
E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates 4–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12924, 
2007) [hereinafter Finkelstein, Working Paper]. 
 16. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416–24 
(1956); see Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1122–23 (1999). 
For a survey of contemporary extrapolations and responses, see Dennis Epple & Thomas Nechyba, 
Fiscal Decentralization, in HANDBOOK OF URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS 2423, 2423–80 (J. 
Vernon Henderson & Jacques-Francois eds., 2004). 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol87/iss1/2
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leading to inefficiently high tax rates.
17
 However, as I review here, there 
has never been any convincing empirical evidence that low salience results 
in higher taxes. I argue that, in fact, that view rests on several faulty 
assumptions. For instance, in a world where some voters know that taxes 
are hidden from others, the usual incentive to free-ride on lobbying efforts 
of others unravels, so that hidden taxes may actually lead to more anti-tax 
lobbying and lower taxes.  
In short, the fact that some taxes may be less salient than others can be 
more than a happy accident; it may well be a feature of the tax system we 
should intentionally seek to develop, just as with other proposals for the 
optimally efficient tax. However, before we go down that road, with its 
troubling implications for democratic theory, it might be wise to first 
consider some possible limits on the efficiency-enhancing potential of 
hidden taxes. 
Part I of this Article offers readers new to the tax literature a short 
overview of the economics of taxation. Part II explains hidden taxes: their 
potential forms, existing evidence that they may affect behavior, the 
welfare implications of these findings, and the uncertain cognitive science 
behind what we have observed. Part III considers two possible objections 
to the claim that hidden taxes might increase social welfare: taxpayers may 
anticipate hidden taxes, or learn to recognize them. Similarly, Part IV 
analyzes the potential welfare losses from hidden taxes, such as from 
inefficiently large government, or from redistribution from poor to rich. 
Part V previews some of the policy implications that would result if 
hidden taxes genuinely could increase welfare, including the chance that 
we might face a conflict between open and democratic government and 
greater social welfare.  
I. THE ECONOMICS OF THE FAIRNESS/EFFICIENCY DILEMMA 
This Part sketches the economic underpinnings of the progressive tax 
dilemma. Readers already familiar with the economics of taxation may 
safely skip to the last paragraph.  
Before beginning my analysis of hidden taxes, let me take a step back 
for a moment and first explain why fairness is said to be costly. Start with 
the basics of supply and demand. In a well-functioning market, social 
 
 
 17. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 24–32, 40 (1980); Susanne Lohmann & Deborah M. 
Weiss, Hidden Taxes and Representative Government: The Political Economy of the Ramsey Rule, 30 
PUB. FIN. REV. 579, 579–611 (2002). 
Wash U Law Repository
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welfare is maximized when goods are exchanged at the so-called 
equilibrium price, the point at which the marginal consumer’s willingness 
to pay for the good is exactly equal to the marginal cost of producing the 
next unit of it.
18
 Every unit sold before that point is sold at profit, and also 
feels like a ―bargain‖ for the consumer, who (assuming the typical 
downward-sloping demand curve) was willing to pay more than the 
equilibrium price.
19
 Thus, nearly every exchange increases society’s total 
utility.
20
  
Taxes ruin this happy story by increasing the effective price of taxed 
goods.
21
 Because the taxed item now costs more, fewer people want it, 
meaning that there are fewer utility-enhancing exchanges.
22
 Furthermore, 
since there is only a tax when the good is actually exchanged, this 
diminution is a pure ―deadweight loss‖; it reduces welfare, without taking 
in any revenues for use by the government.
23
 Alternatively, consumers 
may still buy goods similar to those taxed, but they will shift to an item 
that is less preferred but cheaper after tax, which also diminishes their 
satisfaction.
24
 Figure 1 illustrates these principles.
25
 
 
 
 18. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 280. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.; Auerbach, supra note 6, at 68. 
 22. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 280. 
 23. Id. at 284. To be clear, the deadweight loss or ―excess burden‖ of the tax is the change in 
total social welfare resulting from the substitution effect of the tax. The assumption here is that we can 
hold income constant; taxes are exchanged for government services on a one-for-one basis. Thus, a tax 
that only collected revenue and did not change any behavior would not create an excess burden. Id. at 
289. This baseline for comparison is often called the ―lump sum‖ tax, on the assumption that an 
undifferentiated tax on every individual would be the least distortive of any possible design. Id. at 287. 
 24. It is possible that these distortions might actually increase welfare in a market that was 
already imperfect. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 294; Stiglitz, supra note 6, at 1023.  
 25. See infra p. 67.  
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol87/iss1/2
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FIGURE 1 
 
We thus come to the conflict between distributive fairness and overall 
welfare. Suppose (as I assume for the sake of argument here) that our 
system of distributive justice requires us to redistribute at least some 
money from richer to poorer.
26
 Every dollar raised through the tax system 
to carry out this redistribution also creates a deadweight loss. The greater 
the amount of redistribution a society carries out, the less well off it is.
27
 
On the other hand, there is a diminishing marginal utility of wealth—a 
dollar is worth more to those who have fewer of them.
28
 The implication is 
that moving money from richer to poorer can increase overall utility.
29
 So, 
 
 
 26. For a wide-ranging overview of different approaches to the imperative for redistribution, see 
JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1996). 
 27. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 83.  
 28. Id. at 78–79. 
 29. Id. 
Tax= 
$.50 
Deadweight 
Loss 
Pre-tax  
Supply 
After-tax 
Supply 
Demand 
Price 
Quantity 
Transferred to  
recipients of  
government spending 
Pre-tax  
equilibrium 
After-tax 
equilibrium 
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taking this factor into account, there is at best a welfare tradeoff inherent 
in any redistribution.
30
  
The welfare/fairness tradeoff is especially acute in the design of an 
income tax.
31
 A progressive tax, for example, is one in which more of the 
burden of taxation is borne by wealthier taxpayers.
32
 Progressive taxes are 
inherently redistributive: even if revenues are spent equally on all citizens, 
progressive taxation ensures that the richest pay more than the per capita 
value of the spending, while the poorest pay less.
33
 The progressive 
component of a tax system can be greatly enhanced by the use of a 
progressive rate structure—that is, a structure in which the tax rate also 
rises with income.
34
 However, the substitution effect of a tax rises with the 
tax rate.
35
 Thus, unless the substitution effect distortion is counteracted by 
an income effect, progressive taxes lead to larger deadweight losses.
36
 
There is evidence that, at least at very high tax rates, income taxes 
encourage taxpayers to shift from the taxed good, labor, to the untaxed 
substitutes: leisure and ―off-the-books‖ labor.37  
Economists and tax lawyers have proposed to resolve this taxing 
problem by attempting to impose taxes on decisions that are very unlikely 
 
 
 30. MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND REDISTRIBUTION 3 (1990). It is worth 
emphasizing that this account leaves aside any additional welfare gains society might realize from 
achieving its preference for the ideal distribution of goods, over and above gains from the diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 961, 990–93 (2001). 
 31. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 1945. 
 32. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 523 (2d ed. 2007). 
 33. For instance, suppose three citizens, Al, Betty, and Cash. Al earns $100, Betty $1000, and 
Cash $10,000. There is a 10% tax rate. Obviously, total revenues are ($10 + $100 + $1000) = $1110. If 
spending is equal, the government spends $370 on each. So Cash has transferred $630 to Al and Betty, 
with Betty receiving $270 and Al receiving $360.  
 34. To return to Al, Betty, and Cash, assume now a progressive rate structure in which Al pays 
1% tax, Betty 5%, and Cash 10%. Revenues now are ($1 + $50 + $1000) = $1051, and per capita 
spending roughly $350. Cash has transferred $650, compared to $630 under a flat tax.  
 35. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 290. To reiterate, a ―substitution effect‖ is the 
change in behavior caused by the change in price of one good relative to other options. It should be 
contrasted with the ―income effect,‖ which is a change in behavior resulting from alterations in an 
individual’s wealth.  
 36. Although income and substitution effects are not always at cross-currents, they do seem to 
work in opposite directions in the case of the income tax: taxing labor encourages a substitution 
towards leisure, while lower income increases the utility value of an additional hour of labor.  
 37. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 1921–23; Jon Gruber & Emmanuel Saez, The Elasticity 
of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 1–32 (2002); Mark H. Showalter 
& Norman K. Thurston, Taxes and Labor Supply of High-Income Physicians, 66 J. PUB. ECON. 73, 
90–91 (1997) (finding that the response by self-employed physicians to higher marginal tax rates 
suggests that the zero elasticity of federal revenue with respect to the top end marginal tax rate is in 
part due to changes in the labor supply). 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol87/iss1/2
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to change.
38
 In slightly more technical language, the prescription is to tax 
inelastic behavior more heavily. That is the classic account set out by 
Ramsey, Mirrlees, and others.
39
 
Again, though, the typical tax on inelastic behavior does not escape the 
conflict with distributive justice. For one thing, most inelastic taxes are 
regressive—that is, they fall disproportionately on poorer taxpayers.40 
Inelastically demanded goods, such as food and prescription drugs, are 
usually just the things that occupy most of an indigent taxpayer’s budget.41 
Other nondistortive taxes, such as a uniform ―head tax‖ on every 
individual, would raise only a small fraction of the revenue needed for 
social insurance programs for the indigent.
42
  
Thus, as Mirrlees argued, the ―optimal‖ tax would balance efficiency 
against the need for redistribution.
43
 That is, the ideal tax rate would be 
one that maximizes the tradeoff between the welfare gains from satisfying 
society’s preference for distributive fairness and the deadweight loss of 
progressive tax rates.
44
 In the income tax context, this has included 
proposals ranging from a mildly progressive rate structure to an outright 
regressive tax rate, although in the second case the tax would be combined 
with a flat grant to every citizen to render the system progressive overall.
45
  
Mirrlees’s solution, although in many ways elegant, has hardly ended 
debate over progressive taxation. Many commentators continue to 
advocate for completely flat rates, or even head taxes, pointing again to the 
distortive effects of taxation on the economy.
46
 From the other direction, 
proponents of more progressive taxation could perhaps argue that optimal 
 
 
 38. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 292–93. 
 39. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 40. GRUBER, supra note 32, at 523. 
 41. See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the 
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1680–82 (2005); Chetty et al., 
supra note 10, at 50. 
 42. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 2, at 1631–38. 
 43. Mirrlees, supra note 6, at 175. 
 44. Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the 
Income Tax, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 135, 137 (1996). 
 45. TUOMALA, supra note 30, at 8–9, 12–14; Kaplow, supra note 44, at 138. The regressive tax 
plus flat grant is progressive overall because the flat grant amount is more valuable to lower-income 
taxpayers.  
 46. E.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (Hoover Inst. Press 2d ed. 
1995); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical 
Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 221, 269–71 (1995); ROBERT E. 
HALL ET AL., AMERICAN ENTER. INST., FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX (1996), 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20021130_70450.pdf; Daniel J. Mitchell, Commentary, Russia’s Flat-Tax 
Miracle, The Heritage Foundation, Mar. 24, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ 
ed032403.cfm;. 
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tax theory is unrealistic to the extent that it depends on flat grants to 
achieve progressivity. Spending can iron out tax inequalities, but where 
spending decisions are politically separate from tax determinations, there 
is arguably a danger that an unfair tax system will simply produce unfair 
results. But if one is dealing in theoretical ideals, this critique is less than 
trenchant.  
Hidden taxes, in contrast, present a potential challenge both to optimal 
tax theory as well as to opponents of progressive taxation more generally. 
If progressive taxes can be imposed in a way that minimizes behavioral 
responses, and therefore deadweight losses, then the optimal degree of 
progressivity might shift significantly towards higher rates on wealthier 
taxpayers. I explore the plausibility of that outcome in the Parts that 
follow. 
II. BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF HIDDEN TAXES 
This Part introduces the concept of hidden taxes and their potential role 
in tax economics. After briefly sketching in Part II.A. some possible forms 
that hidden taxes may take, I then survey in Part II.B. the evidence that 
some taxes are less salient than others. Part II.C. explores the welfare 
implications of these findings. Part II.D. then argues that the current 
literature has not yet offered a convincing account of what mental 
processes are responsible for diminished consumer response to tax, 
leaving some major holes in the story suggested by Part II.C. 
A. Forms of Hidden Taxation 
In order to help the reader develop intuitions for the remaining 
discussion, it may be useful to survey some of the forms a hidden tax 
might take on. Marketers and advertisers have spent decades developing 
techniques for reducing the price consumers perceive for commercial 
products.
47
 In an important paper, Krishna and Slemrod predict that many 
 
 
 47. Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 408, 409–11 (2004); 
Vicki G. Morwitz et al., The Price Does Not Include Additional Taxes, Fees, and Surcharges: A 
Review of Research on Partitioned Pricing 6–10 (Feb. 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1350004); see Aradhna Krishna et al., A Meta-
Analysis of the Impact of Price Presentation on Perceived Savings, 78 J. RETAILING 101, 101–18 
(2002). Salience also affects consumer responses to non-price product qualities. E.g., Kristin Kiesel & 
Sofia B. Villas-Boas, Another Nutritional Label—Experimenting with Grocery Store Shelf Labels and 
Consumer Choice 16–17 (CUDARE, Working Paper 1060, 2008), available at http://ideas.repec.org/ 
p/cdl/agrebk/1060.html.  
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of these techniques can also lower the perceived cost of taxation.
48
  
Among the most important of these ―price presentation‖ tactics is the 
splitting of a purchase price into a series of small future payments.
49
 
Consumers may perceive the sum of a series of small payments as 
considerably less than its actual present value.
50
 This idea has a number of 
ready applications to tax. Sales taxes, for example, are a form of public 
financing that divides a taxpayer’s contribution into many tiny pieces. 
Classic fiscal federalism theory predicts that citizens will choose where to 
live based on the basket of public goods received in exchange for total 
taxes paid.
51
 By dividing the total tax ―price‖ for its basket of public goods 
into many small transactions, a jurisdiction can make itself appear to be a 
better bargain than its competitors.
52
 Similarly, the marginal propensity of 
an individual to work depends on the rate of tax imposed on that labor, 
since salary minus tax determines the opportunity cost of enjoying time off 
instead.
53
 If, instead of a single stated tax, the worker confronts a series of 
small tax payments—for instance, if there is income-tax withholding—she 
may underestimate the tax she pays and work ―too much‖ relative to her 
underlying preference for work vs. leisure.
54
  
Prices are also difficult for consumers to identify where costs depend in 
part on future events. Consumers typically have imperfect information 
about how often these future events will occur, and may systematically 
underestimate total cost as a result.
55
 For instance, a number of credit card 
 
 
 48. Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price 
Presentation, 10 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 189, 189 (2003). 
 49. Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 193–94. On the effect of splitting two simultaneous 
components of price, see John M. Clark & Sidne G. Ward, Consumer Behavior in Online Auctions: An 
Examination of Partitioned Prices on eBay, 16 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 57, 57–66 (2008); 
Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan, . . . Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in 
Field Experiments on eBay, 6 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 1–4 (2006); Vicki G. Morwitz 
et al., Divide and Prosper: Consumers’ Reactions to Partitioned Prices, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 453, 
453–63 (1998).  
 50. Jerry A. Hausman, Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-
Using Durables, 10 BELL J. ECON. 33, 33–34 (1979); see Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, supra note 11, 
at 196. 
 51. Oates, supra note 16, at 1122–23. 
 52. See Dollery & Worthington, supra note 12, at 264; cf. Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 
192 (projecting that governments will prefer to use sales taxes). 
 53. See sources cited supra note 37. On the other hand, as Joe Bankman suggested during a 
presentation of this paper, if people choose their career or their residence on the basis of a rough 
estimate of the lifestyle the job or venue provides, perceived tax rates are unlikely to affect those kinds 
of choices.  
 54. ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, HOW AMERICANS THINK ABOUT TAXES: PUBLIC OPINION AND 
THE AMERICAN FISCAL STATE (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 25–26, on file with author). 
 55. See Oren Bar-Gill, Informing Consumers About Themselves 2, 14 (N.Y. Univ. Law and Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-44, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
Wash U Law Repository
  
 
 
 
 
72 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:59 
 
 
 
 
contracts permit the issuer to charge late and default fees.
56
 In recent 
studies, many consumers appear wrongly to have assumed that they will 
not incur such fees, and as a result have selected cards whose expected 
cost, including fees, is higher than the optimal choice.
57
  
Taxes, too, may appear to be lower at the time of a relevant decision 
than their true future cost because of taxpayer misestimates of future 
events. A citizen may vote to approve a carbon tax on the assumption that 
she will bike to work and insulate her home, but later lack the willpower to 
give up her car, or lack the cash (as a result of other consumption 
decisions) to hire a carpenter. Individuals or businesses may relocate to a 
jurisdiction with user fees expecting to be able to avoid those fees, but 
then find that they are unable to do so. Others may plan to submit claims 
for optional refunds, as in the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit or the 
European VAT system, but never do so.
58
  
These scenarios are all plausible extrapolations from existing consumer 
studies. It is worth emphasizing that no studies have yet confirmed that 
these precise forms of cognitively challenging taxes in fact change 
taxpayer behavior. But these fact patterns are suggestive of the many ways 
in which hidden taxes might be deployed.  
B. Evidence on Tax Salience 
While there are no studies directly confirming the price presentation 
theory, there is now a substantial literature suggesting that individuals are 
less than fully aware of the extent of their fiscal obligations to the state. A 
number of early studies, likely sparked by the Nobel-winning economist 
James Buchanan, simply posited the hypothesis that less-salient tax 
systems permit higher levels of taxation.
59
 The researchers then attempted 
 
 
1056381. 
 56. Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 29. 
 57. Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 249, 263 (1997); Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card 
Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 75–76 (1991); Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract 
Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 Q. J. ECON. 353, 377–79 (2004); David B. Gross 
& Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? 
Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 Q. J. ECON. 149, 171 (2002); Sha Yang et al., Unrealistic 
Optimism in Consumer Credit Card Adoption, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL., 170, 181 (2007).  
 58. See Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 194. For evidence on the low rate of rebate claims, 
see Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing, and Behavioral Economics of Consumer Rebates, 12 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 368–69 (2007) (collecting sources); Tim Silk & Chris Janiszewski, 
Managing Mail-in Rebate Promotions 5 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.cba.ufl.edu/ 
mkt/docs/janiszewski/Rebate.pdf). 
 59. James M. Buchanan, The fiscal illusion, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: 
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to measure relationships between putatively less-visible taxes and the size 
of government.
60
 These studies were inconclusive.
61
 It therefore is unclear 
from the size-of-government studies whether voters respond differently to 
low-salience taxes. For example, it is possible that voters do react 
differently to a less-noticeable tax, but political officials are still unable or 
unwilling to raise taxes in response.  
McCaffery and Baron advanced the debate through a series of 
laboratory simulations of tax setting.
62
 Test subjects were willing to 
tolerate higher overall tax levels when the tax was imposed through many 
smaller taxes, rather than through a single large tax.
63
 McCaffery and 
Baron dubbed this phenomenon the ―disaggregation bias‖; subjects 
appeared unable to hold together in their minds the cumulative effects of 
several separate, overlapping tax regimes.
64
 And subjects seemed to resist 
income taxes more than payroll or business taxes, which McCaffery and 
Baron thought were more hidden.
65
 
Other recent laboratory studies are similar. Sausgruber and Tyran 
report that their subjects were willing to accept higher taxes when the tax 
was nominally imposed on sellers rather than buyers, even though the 
ultimate economic burden of the tax did not change.
66
 And Blumkin et al. 
find that lab subjects who were paid a small reward worked harder when 
the tax on the reward was presented as a sales rather than income tax.
67
  
 
 
FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 135, 135 (1967). 
 60. Dollery & Worthington, supra note 12, at 293–94. 
 61. Oates, supra note 8, at 66; Dollery & Worthington, supra note 12, at 293–94. 
 62. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 7, at 289; Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking 
About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 106 (2006); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The 
Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (2005) [hereinafter McCaffery & 
Baron, Political Psychology]; Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: 
Disaggregation Bias in the Evaluation of Tax Systems, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 230 (2003). 
 63. McCaffery & Baron, Political Psychology, supra note 62, at 1765–68, 1773–80. 
 64. Although McCaffery and Baron term this a ―bias,‖ one could argue that the preference the 
subjects were expressing was rational. After all, deadweight losses typically are increasing in 
proportion to the amount of tax on any given base. We can therefore minimize distortions by spreading 
the incidence of taxation widely. Subjects might thus have been opting for a less distortive tax regime. 
However, there is little indication that these considerations were motivating the subjects. For example, 
many shifted their preferences towards the lower, unitary tax after counseling.  
 65. McCaffery & Baron, Political Psychology, supra note 62, at 1761–64. 
 66. Ruper Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation 2 (Univ. of 
Copenhagen Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 08-21, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292731. 
 67. Tomer Blumkin et al., Are Income and Consumption Taxes Ever Really Equivalent? 
Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods 4–14 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies, IFO Inst. for 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2194, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1079784. 
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These results dovetail with real-world studies of bounded voter 
rationality, which is said to result in a ―fiscal illusion‖: voters misperceive 
taxing and spending systems.
68
 For instance, the ―flypaper effect‖ 
literature reports numerous instances in which local government entities 
received grants but failed to reduce their own revenue efforts in response 
to the infusion of outside cash.
69
 That result is contrary to what we should 
likely expect of fully rational actors in the absence of matching grants.
70
 
Although the flypaper literature is still evolving, one powerful explanation 
consistent with much of the data is that local voters are unaware of the 
new, improved fiscal condition of their government, or misconceive the 
relationship between the grant and the opportunity to reduce their own tax 
expenditures.
71
 Similarly, some unpublished studies report that individual 
taxpayers behave in unexpected ways in response to the federal tax 
 
 
 68. Oates, supra note 8, at 65. 
 69. Katherine Baicker, Government Decision-Making and the Incidence of Federal Mandates, 82 
J. PUB. ECON. 147, 177–78 (2001); Rebecca J. Campbell, Leviathan and Fiscal Illusion in Local 
Government Overlapping Jurisdictions, 120 PUB. CHOICE 301, 324 (2004); Radu Filimon et al., 
Asymmetric Information and Agenda Control: The Bases of Monopoly Power in Public Spending, 17 J. 
PUB. ECON. 51, 60–61 (1982); Nora Gordon, Do Federal Grants Boost School Spending? Evidence 
from Title I, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1771, 1773 (2004); Peter M. Mitias & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Grant 
Illusion, Tax Illusion, and Local Government Spending, 29 PUB. FIN. REV. 347, 361 (2001); Geoffrey 
K. Turnbull, The Overspending and Flypaper Effects of Fiscal Illusion: Theory and Empirical 
Evidence, 44 J. URB. ECON. 1, 15–232 (1998); Byron F. Lutz, Taxation with Representation: 
Intergovernmental Grants in a Plebiscite Democracy 24 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working 
Paper No. 2006–06, 2006), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/FEDS/2006/200606/ 
200606pap.pdf. But see Brian Knight, Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State 
Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program, 92 AM. ECON. 
REV. 71, 88 (2002) (―[F]ederal highway grants crowd out state highway spending, leading to little or 
no increase in net spending.‖). 
 70. David F. Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, The Analysis of Revenue Sharing in a New Approach 
to Collective Fiscal Decisions, 85 Q.J. ECON. 416, 420–23, 434 (1971) (explaining how a lump sum 
distributed to a group may have diffuse economic benefit to all individuals through revenue sharing); 
David F. Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, Towards a Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental Grants, 61 
AM. ECON. REV. 440, 443 (1971) (suggesting that given certain conditions, a system that gave grants 
to individuals could ―lead[] via the political process to precisely the same equilibrium state of the 
community as does the grant to the collectivity‖); Ronald C. Fisher, Income and Grant Effects on 
Local Expenditure: The Flypaper Effect and Other Difficulties, 12 J. URB. ECON. 324, 325–26 (1982). 
That is, the grant shifts the state’s demand curve for government services outward without changing its 
shape. For example, if I want my government to spend $100 on roads, I will vote in favor of $100 in 
road spending, regardless of whether someone else gives me another $50. Thus, when my government 
receives the $50 grant, I will expect it to spend $100 on roads and cut my taxes by $50. Or, I may be 
willing to spend slightly more than $100, as a result of the additional wealth represented by the grant. 
Fisher, supra, at 328. But that will simply shift my demand curve for all normal goods, including 
roads, outwards slightly.  This analysis does not work perfectly for matching grants, which for 
obvious reasons tend to encourage the state to spend more than it would otherwise prefer on the 
matched expenditure. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 116–19 (2000). 
 71. For a more thorough discussion of the fiscal illusion explanation for observed flypaper data, 
see Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 875, 926–30 (2008).  
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol87/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2009] HIDDEN TAXES 75 
 
 
 
 
system, most likely because they do not understand the concept of 
marginal tax rates.
72
 
Finally, a set of quite recent results provides stronger evidence yet that 
taxpayers not only vote differently in response to hidden taxes, but also 
change their consumption decisions. In one of these studies, purchasers 
were more sensitive to after-tax prices when the amount of the sales tax 
was posted.
73
 Surveys of the shoppers studied found that the shoppers 
knew to a fairly high degree of precision the amount of sales tax in their 
jurisdiction at the time they entered the store.
74
 A possible implication is 
that in the absence of a posted notice of the sales tax, consumers make 
consumption decisions before they get to the register, without computing 
the likely sales tax, and do not change their minds once they see the tax-
inclusive bill.
75
 This may suggest that, because the unposted sales tax has a 
relatively low salience, it has lower behavioral effects than the exact same 
tax when the tax rate is posted. As Chetty et al. argue, consumers may 
engage in a kind of cognitive loafing: they know of the tax but simply 
don’t bother to compute the tax-inclusive price of an individual item, 
perhaps because the utility of avoiding that calculation is higher than the 
value of the savings.
76
  
Another economist, Amy Finkelstein, has made similar findings. In her 
study, she observed that where tolls were collected electronically, and 
therefore somewhat beneath the notice of the toll payers, the demand for 
driving on toll roads was less elastic.
77
 That is, drivers were less sensitive 
to toll increases than they had been at the same facility before the 
electronic toll collection and less sensitive than other contemporaneous 
 
 
 72. Naomi Feldman & Peter Katuščák, Should the Average Tax Rate be Marginalized? (Ctr. For 
Econ. Research & Graduate Educ., Working Paper No. 304, 2006); Jeffrey B. Liebman & Richard J. 
Zeckhauser, Schmeduling (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.hks.harvard. 
edu/jeffreyliebman/schmeduling.pdf); cf. Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 196–97 (describing 
phenomenon whereby consumers erroneously evaluate savings based on percentages rather than 
absolute dollar amounts). 
 73. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 10–18. 
 74. Id. at 26–28. 
 75. This result is subject to two interpretations, only one of which supports my thesis here. One 
conclusion, as I suggest in the body text, is that the increased salience of the sales tax increases the 
consumer’s response to the tax. An alternative conclusion is that consumers are tax-averse; that is, they 
are less willing to pay a given price knowing that some portion of it is a ―tax‖ rather than simply a 
―price.‖ That may not be irrational. For example, the fact that some of the cost of a good is known to 
be tax might indicate that the good could be purchased more cheaply in a jurisdiction with a lower tax, 
and the consumer prefers to postpone purchase until she finds the low-tax opportunity. Again, though, 
the consumers knew the sales tax rate before shopping. This implies that the consumers were willing to 
shop in a jurisdiction where their purchases would be subject to tax.  
 76. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 28–35. 
 77. Finkelstein, Working Paper, supra note 15, at 2. 
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drivers at facilities without electronic collection.
78
 In this case, survey data 
suggested that drivers who used electronic payment not only did not know 
their total periodic toll costs; they also did not know the toll rate.
79
  
Gallagher and Muehlegger also claim to have observed a salience 
effect in their study of tax incentives for fuel-efficient cars, but there are a 
number of potential questions with their results.
80
 According to Gallagher 
and Muehlegger, consumers were much more responsive to sales tax 
incentives to buy hybrid cars than they were to income tax breaks for the 
same purpose. Since sales tax benefits are immediate, while income tax 
benefits do not accrue until the following year when the purchaser files her 
income tax return, we should expect some preference for sales taxes. But 
Gallagher and Muehlegger also found that the effect of the income tax 
incentive was largest in the second quarter of the year, around tax filing 
season, whereas on a pure time-value-of-money calculation the best time 
to buy would be in December.
81
 They argue that this timing result suggests 
that the greater salience of the income tax around filing season improves 
the efficacy of the income tax incentive, even though a purchase in April 
will not be deductible until the following year.  
There are a number of factors that Gallagher and Muehlegger do not 
appear to control for that could confound their salience result.
82
 For one, 
the greater efficacy of the more immediate sales-tax discount could be 
caused by a higher than average time-discounting rate among some 
consumers. Next, if we should expect a spike in an income tax incentive’s 
efficacy around filing season, there should also be a spike in the fourth 
quarter caused by taxpayers who obtained six-month extensions. Gallagher 
and Muehlegger report instead that the effect of the incentive declined 
―monotonically with each successive quarter‖ after the first.83 Unobserved 
characteristics of buyers could also be driving their result. The study did 
not observe advertising by dealers, which may have been more intensive 
 
 
 78. Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 18–30. 
 79. Id. at 14–16. 
 80. Kelly Sims Gallagher & Erich Muehlegger, Giving Green to Get Green: Incentives and 
Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology 22–24, 28 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, 
Working Paper No. RWP08-009, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1083716.  
 81. Id. at 23–24. December is ideal because it is closest to the end of the tax year. The best time 
to buy would be the day before filing taxes, since that would minimize the time cost of waiting for the 
deduction. But of course income taxes are usually calculated annually, so for taxpayers on a calendar-
year tax year, December is the closest one can come to the buy-today, file-tomorrow optimum.  
 82. To be fair, the public version of the Gallagher and Muehlegger draft is still at the working 
paper stage. 
 83. Gallagher & Muehlegger, supra note 80, at 24. 
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during ―tax season‖ in areas offering income tax incentives. Finally, 
perhaps the second quarter is a time when purchasers who are especially 
price-sensitive are disproportionately in the market: students, those 
anticipating extensive summer travel (with accompanying trips to the 
pump), or model-year-end bargain hunters.
84
 Since those individuals 
would have more elastic demand, they would make it look as though the 
tax incentive were more effective.
85
 Thus, although this latest study is 
suggestive, it is not yet a significant advance over Chetty et al. and 
Finkelstein. 
Notwithstanding some doubts about ―green‖ incentives, the evidence 
so far seems to be generally in line with the intuition I laid out at the 
outset. Where individuals do not fully perceive the burden of a tax, or 
where not all individuals perceive it, the total behavioral changes in 
response to the tax, whether in voting or consumption, are smaller.  
C. Hidden Taxes and Welfare 
Both the Chetty et al. and Finkelstein papers suggest a provocative 
conclusion that may follow from their data: hidden taxes may be more 
efficient than others.
86
 The basic premise is deceptively simple. As I 
explained in Part I, taxes that change behavior of rational actors in 
efficient markets reduce overall welfare, because by definition the 
undistorted choices of self-maximizing actors represent their best possible 
subjective outcome.
87
 In the case of hidden taxes, however, there is a 
smaller behavioral response than in a perfectly visible tax.
88
 Thus, the 
 
 
 84. Gallagher and Muehlegger do control for quarter fixed-effects, which might soak up some of 
these variations. Gallagher and Muehlegger, supra note 80, at 27. 
 85. Although this elasticity-of-demand story would also likely be true of sales taxes, it is unclear 
from the public version of Gallagher and Muehlegger whether sales tax effectiveness varies by quarter. 
In e-mail with this author, Prof. Muehlegger reports that the study did not observe any changes in sales 
tax effectiveness.  
 86. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 36–51; Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 4. 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 18–25. 
 88. Blumkin et al., supra note 67, at 16. It might be argued that the significance of this point is 
much diminished to the extent that all potential substitutes for the good are subject to tax. That is, if 
the consumer will pay a comparable amount of tax no matter what she decides, then there is no 
substitution effect (although there is still an income effect). (I am grateful to Joe Dodge and Steve 
Salop for this point.)  
 In practice, though, this situation almost never arises. For example, even if all goods are subject to 
sales tax, a consumer can save instead, or purchase on the black market. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 44, at 
146 (noting estimates of $100 billion U.S. tax revenue lost to blackmarket transactions). Both of these 
alternatives become less attractive if taxes are hidden. Likewise, even if all labor earnings are taxed 
similarly, a consumer can substitute leisure for work.  
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distortion away from the social optimum point is smaller.
89
 This is 
illustrated by figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 
Indeed, the welfare gains from reduced distortions increase 
dramatically as the amount of distortion diminishes. That is because the 
deadweight loss from tax (or, conversely, the welfare gains from 
eliminating deadweight loss) increase in proportion to the square of the 
 
 
 89. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 38–40. This description assumes a market that would be 
efficient if not for tax. In the case of distortions that might be offset by tax, such as Pigouvian taxes on 
externalities, a diminished behavioral effect would actually reduce welfare. Thus, cigarette taxes, 
carbon taxes and the like should be designed to be as visible as possible. See Finkelstein, supra note 9, 
at 12–13.  
 Also, readers attentive to technical detail should be aware that for expositional purposes my 
description here assumes that compensated and uncompensated demand coincide. Chetty et al. also 
discuss situations where that is not the case, as I will address shortly.  
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size of the distortion.
90
 Figure 2 also illustrates this point. Notice that the 
area of deadweight loss is a triangle with legs comprised of the shift along 
the supply and demand curves.
91
 Thus, since the area of a right triangle is 
one-half the product of its two legs, and the two legs here are of the same 
length, the area of deadweight loss increases with the square of the 
distance that the tax shifts the supply curve.  
One important complication, as both studies acknowledge, is that 
hidden taxes may not necessarily increase welfare for consumers.
92
 In 
essence, the hidden tax causes the consumer to buy an item she would not 
otherwise have purchased at that price, so that she experiences a loss to the 
extent she overpays. However, since the amount of the overpayment is 
exactly equal to the amount of additional tax collected, society as a whole 
comes out even.
93
 At least, society comes out even if taxes are not wasted, 
and recipients of spending on average are no wealthier than the misled 
customers.  
Another wrinkle in this story arises where there are distortions not only 
from the substitution effect but also from income effects.
94
 That is, at 
times the mere fact that a taxpayer has less money will change what she 
buys or the amount of work she does. For instance, if the consumer 
doesn’t realize her bank account is low, she may find at the end of the 
month she doesn’t have enough cash for the things she planned to buy.  
Chetty et al. attempt to minimize this problem by arguing that the 
consumer’s welfare losses may be small, depending on how she orders her 
purchase decisions.
95
 That is, the reason the consumer loses welfare when 
she overpays is because she has lost an opportunity to buy other goods 
with her available funds. The size of that second-order welfare loss 
depends on which goods are crowded out by the hidden tax. If the 
 
 
 90. Auerbach, supra note 6, at 74. 
 91. The figure depicts the deadweight loss triangles caused by a first distortion, from point A to 
point C, and a second, smaller distortion resulting when the equilibrium point is shifted back to point 
B.  
 92. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 41–47; Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 10. Blumkin et al. argue 
that a laborer’s utility can be unchanged even under a totally opaque consumption tax, because 
consumption remains constant in the shift from income to consumption taxation. Blumkin et al., supra 
note 67, at 16–18. But to obtain that result, the worker has to work more, giving up leisure. That 
should reduce the worker’s welfare. As best this author can discern, Blumkin et al. appear not to 
include a term for welfare losses from foregone leisure in their proof.  
 93. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 38. 
 94. Id. at 42–43. 
 95. Id. at 41–46; see also B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: 
Choice Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics 23–24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 13737, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1086986 (modeling generalized version of the Chetty et al. theory). 
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consumer gives up only the least-preferred item she would otherwise have 
bought, her loss is much smaller than if she gives up the first. In other 
words, if paying too much because of hidden taxes leaves us without 
money for a pack of gum or a fifth DVD per month from Netflix, we’re 
not so bad off, but if it leaves us at the end of the month just short of 
making rent, the tax hurts us pretty badly. Thus, Chetty et al. argue that the 
amount of welfare loss for consumers will depend on their ability to 
recognize that they are paying hidden taxes and to order their purchases 
accordingly.
96
 Whether or not this is a plausible possibility is a subject I 
will return to shortly.  
Irrespective of consumer losses, hidden taxes may still on net increase 
welfare because they also create both producer surplus and government 
revenues. That is, under a hidden tax producers make additional, profitable 
sales beyond those that they would have made at the perfectly transparent 
post-tax equilibrium.
97
 And there will be more transactions subject to tax, 
the proceeds of which can be used for welfare-enhancing projects, 
transfers to the poor, and so on. This is not the venue for detailed 
mathematical proofs, but in general we should expect these two effects to 
often be larger than the consumer’s welfare loss, assuming that consumers 
and producers are of comparable wealth.
98
 That result is magnified if 
Chetty et al. are correct in claiming that consumer welfare losses are only 
second-order.
99
  
 
 
 96. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 42–44. For a summary of studies of consumer capacity to 
allocate their budgets across purchases, see Daniel Read et al., Choice Bracketing, 19 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 171, 185 (1999). In general, ―[m]oney saved in one category will be recycled into that 
category.‖ Id. This supports the Chetty et al. story: expenditures in, say, grooming products are 
unlikely to affect choices of health care or food. 
 97. Technically, whether these additional sales are profitable will depend on the extent to which 
the producer bears the incidence of the tax or instead is able to shift the cost of the tax to consumers. I 
assume that hidden taxes will typically be shifted somewhat from producers to consumers, so that 
there will be at least some producer surplus. See Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 47–50 (projecting that 
incidence of hidden taxes will be shifted towards those who are unaware of tax).  
 98. For those who want slightly more detail, this welfare-increasing result assumes that, as we 
move from a perfectly transparent tax equilibrium to some hidden tax equilibrium, ΔSp + ΔUt > ΔSc; 
that is, that the new utility resulting from transfer of the additional tax from payors to beneficiaries of 
government spending, combined with the changes in producer surplus, exceed any losses in consumer 
surplus. Under a benevolent government where taxes and spending increase welfare, this means that 
hidden taxes will sometimes overall improve social welfare even where consumers are harmed more 
than producers are benefitted by the hidden tax.  
 Because of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, the tradeoff will become less attractive as 
producers or government beneficiaries become wealthier than consumers. One obvious way to help 
ensure that the ledger balances between beneficiaries and consumers is to include compensation for 
hidden taxpayers as part of the resulting government expenditure.   
 99. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 41–46. 
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This analysis also leads to my own policy prescription for hidden taxes, 
which I believe is new to the literature. The shape of the supply and 
demand curves will affect the size of consumer and producer surplus: for 
inelastically demanded goods, where the demand curve is fairly flat, 
consumer surplus is smaller than producer surplus, and vice versa.
100
 Thus, 
we can predict that hidden taxes are more likely to be welfare-increasing 
for inelastically demanded goods. Relatedly, we can minimize any welfare 
losses resulting from transfers from relatively poorer consumers to 
comparatively richer producers by reserving hidden taxes for markets 
where those who benefit from hidden taxes are no wealthier than those 
who might lose welfare.
101
  
In short, under our working set of assumptions there is a significant 
possibility that many hidden taxes will on net increase social welfare. 
Unfortunately, those assumptions have a large hole in them. It is possible 
that, depending on what drives the behavioral changes associated with 
hidden taxes, those taxes in fact might become more visible as they grow 
larger, which would make any potential welfare gains rather small. Thus, I 
turn now to considering the possible mechanisms that lead taxpayers to 
overlook hidden taxes.  
D. Conflicting Theories of Taxpayer Cognition 
At present it is unclear what mental processes are driving the 
behavioral effects of hidden taxes. Taxpayers may neglect to consider tax 
unintentionally—for example, because they simply cannot carry out the 
mental computations required to assess the tax accurately. Alternatively, 
taxpayers might deliberately ignore tax, as a way of avoiding the disutility 
they would experience from taking the time to weigh their options. I call 
these possibilities the ―unintentional‖ and ―intentional‖ models of hidden 
taxes, respectively. As we shall see, the question of which model is more 
accurate proves to be highly important in making predictions about the 
effects of hidden taxes outside areas that have currently been subjected to 
empirical study.  
 
 
 100. In the instance where there are income-effect distortions, it is not technically accurate to refer 
to a single ―consumer surplus,‖ but the description here still captures the essence of what is going on in 
that scenario, as well.  
 101. I use ―consumers‖ and ―producer‖ in my discussion here, but the reader should understand 
that in a given market it may be producers who fail to recognize the existence of a hidden tax. In those 
markets, there will be producer, rather than consumer, surplus. The labor market seems a likely 
example here.  
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Chetty et al. outline a rational ignorance model of hidden taxes.
102
 In 
their description, ignoring tax is rational where the utility cost of 
computing the tax is greater than the discounted present value of making a 
decision informed by the correct tax amount. Take a purchaser shopping in 
a drug store, who must decide whether or not to buy a comb on display by 
the register, with a posted price of $1.89. He is aware that there is an 
additional sales tax on the comb of 6.5%. He is willing to pay $2.00 for 
the comb, but not more. The value to him of making the correct 
consumption decision here is tiny; if he overpays, it is only by a few cents. 
Quite plausibly, our shopper is willing to pay a few cents to avoid the 
mental effort of multiplying 1.89 by .065.  
While Chetty et al. do not emphasize time discounting, that, too, is an 
important factor.
103
 The main cost to the shopper of overpaying is that his 
budget for other consumption is now smaller. However, that other 
consumption in all likelihood will happen hours, days, or months after the 
comb decision. So, arguably, the rational consumer should discount the 
value of making a ―correct,‖ tax-informed consumption decision to 
account for the fact that it arrives much later than the cost of computing 
the tax.  
On the other hand, studies of consumer behavior suggest strongly that 
individuals respond to cognitively complex pricing in ways that are 
difficult to explain as having been rationally chosen.
104
 For example, there 
are very large gaps in the price of credit between those who receive the 
best and worst rates, even controlling for credit risk and similar factors.
105
 
Under a rational model, that would imply that the disutility of thinking 
about finances is on the order of thousands of dollars for many of the 
disadvantaged borrowers, which seems an implausibly large figure.
106
 
 
 
 102. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 41–42. This is also the approach taken, albeit with less detail, 
by Lohmann & Weiss, supra note 17, at 609. 
 103. See Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, supra note 12, at 3–4 (explaining significance of time 
discounting for costly decision making models). 
 104. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and 
Policy Analysis with Non-Standard Decision Makers, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS 7, 28 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007); Kahneman, supra note 13, at 
1468–69; DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 19; Morwitz et al., supra note 47, at 11–13. 
 105. Paul S. Calem & Loretta J. Mester, Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit-Card 
Interest Rates, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1327, 1327 (1995); David Laibson et al., A Debt Puzzle, in 
KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND EXPECTATIONS IN MODERN MACROECONOMICS: IN HONOR OF 
EDMUND S. PHELPS 228, 228–29 (Phillippe Aghion et al. eds., 2003); Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age 
of Reason: Financial Decisions Over the Lifecycle 38 (Feb. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=973790); see also sources cited supra 
note 57.  
 106. See James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in FANNIE MAE 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol87/iss1/2
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Alternatively, as some behavioral economists have posited, these results 
make sense if the borrowers have extremely high discount rates—that is, 
they value current gains and losses much, much more than those even in 
the near future.
107
 Indeed, there is now extensive evidence that most 
people are disproportionately sensitive to small, immediate costs; that is 
one of the reasons we procrastinate even essential tasks.
108
 There is 
considerable debate among economists and others whether we should view 
these behaviors as irrational in the sense that they do not maximize 
subjective welfare.
109
 For my purposes here, it is not hugely important 
whether these kinds of irrational decisions reduce subjective welfare; the 
point is that the taxpayer’s response to a hidden tax may not be the result 
of considered reflection at the time of her decision, and may instead be 
difficult for her to control.
110
  
There are a variety of mental processes that might cause individuals 
unintentionally to ignore a tax. Most simply, taxpayers may know the tax 
rate but lack the computational skills to compute its effects.
111
 Or, as with 
the credit card story, they may be ―hyperbolic‖ discounters who place little 
value on future events, so that the current mental effort of computing tax 
 
 
FOUNDATION, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 31, 37 
(2001) (reporting that individuals who could qualify for lower-cost loans took out subprime loans at 
high rates); DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 19 (estimating that cost of biased choice of investment was 
approximately $6,000); id. at 30–31 (noting that fact that information individuals overlooked was 
available for nothing make ―a rational interpretation of the findings less plausible‖); Agarwal et al., 
supra note 105, at 38.  
 107. GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF SUCCESSIVE 
MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON Ch.3 (1992); Gregory Berns et al., Intertemporal 
Choice—Toward an Integrative Framework, 11 TRENDS COG. SCI. 482, 483 (2007); Jonathan Gruber 
& Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier, 5 ADVANCES IN ECON. ANAL. & 
POL’Y 1, 2 (2005).  
 108. George A. Akerloff, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1–19 (1991); 
David A. Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443, 443–77 (1997); 
DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 9; see also Carl A. Kogut, Consumer Search Behavior and Sunk Costs, 
14 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 381, 381 (1990) (stating that consumers appear overly sensitive to costs 
of conducting search for right choice). 
 109. See Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 104, at 8–9; Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 95, at 1–2; 
compare Richard Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
803, 823–31 (2008) with Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 749, 763 (2008). My own view is that while these behaviors may be ―rational‖ in the sense 
that they reflect consumers’ short-term expressed preferences, from the middle- or long-term 
perspective they reduce overall welfare.  
 110. Of course, since my overall inquiry here is whether hidden taxes can increase social welfare, 
it does matter whether unintentional tax decisions reduce the subjective welfare of the taxpayer. But, 
as I argue supra text accompanying notes 86–101, any diminution in welfare the taxpayer suffers as a 
result of a ―wrong‖ purchase decision is likely to be relatively small compared to other social welfare 
gains that result.  
 111. Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 104, at 25; Kahneman, supra note 13, at 1453, 1459, 1464; 
Read et al., supra note 96, at 187; Agarwal et al., supra note 105, at 39. 
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looms much larger in their decision than the later benefit of paying a lower 
price.
112
 The framing of a hidden tax may make it seem smaller.
113
 
Alternatively, people may keep separate ―mental accounts‖ of retail prices 
and taxes, as in the McCaffery and Baron studies, and therefore struggle to 
integrate the two when they have to make a purchase decision.
114
 Finally, 
taxpayers may form their decision to buy based on the first price they see, 
perhaps in order to avoid internal conflict with their desire to make a 
purchase.
115
 What these scenarios have in common is that in all of them it 
makes little difference whether the expected utility of avoiding the tax 
exceeds the disutility of calculating it.  
There is no clear-cut evidence to establish either of these models as 
more prevalent than the other. Again, there is some limited real-world 
evidence that irrational behaviors persist regardless of the financial stakes 
in some non-tax situations.
116
 Laboratory studies are probably of limited 
use, because the stakes are generally too low to induce rationally ignorant 
participants to exert effort. For example, some marketing laboratory 
studies have found that participants whose test performances indicated that 
they found cognition less effortful also were better at spotting hidden 
fees.
117
 Others find the opposite.
118
   
Whether the intentional or unintentional model better depicts taxpayer 
behavior is central to many important questions about hidden taxes. Most 
crucially, the rational model likely implies that hidden taxes cannot be a 
major component of government budgets. Unless taxpayers place an 
extremely high premium on avoiding tax calculations, any large tax 
savings will motivate the rational taxpayer to haul out their calculator or 
 
 
 112. See Berns et al., supra note 107, at 482–83; Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and 
Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351, 352–401 (2002); DellaVigna, supra note 
13, at 3–5. 
 113. See Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 190–91; McCaffery & Baron, supra note 7, at 290; 
Morwitz et al., supra note 47, at 15–16 (noting studies in which consumers were less responsive to 
surcharges they had to remember, to surcharges listed in percentages, and to surcharges shown in a 
small font). 
 114. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 7, at 290–91; see Kahneman, supra note 13, at 1459. 
 115. Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas Mariotti, Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device, 67 
REV. ECON. STUD. 529, 529, 531, 541 (2000); Morwitz et al., supra note 47, at 30–31 (suggesting that 
consumers ―anchor‖ on base price as explanation for why they ignore even fees that are stated right 
next to the base price); see also Kahneman, supra note 13, at 1469 (arguing that individuals may prefer 
to invest effort in bolstering their wrong decision rather than analyzing it). 
 116. See supra note 106. 
 117. Amar Cheema, Surcharges and Seller Reputation, 35 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 167, 173 
(2008). Note that the fact that participants find cognition effortful does not mean that they are 
unskilled at reasoning, and vice-versa. So these studies probably suggest little about the unintentional 
model. 
 118. Morwitz et al., supra note 47, at 20–22. 
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call their accountant.
119
 This suggests in turn that hidden taxes would not 
be a solution to the dilemma of progressive taxation. By definition, 
progressive taxes impose large burdens on high-earners, and under a 
rational model hidden taxes do not change behavior when the stakes are 
large. Which model is accurate also informs other crucial questions about 
hidden taxes, as I will now attempt to show. 
III. ARE HIDDEN TAXES REALLY HIDDEN? 
To this point we have a provisional theory that hidden taxes may 
overall increase social welfare. Although the most basic story for why 
hidden taxes reduce deadweight losses is straightforward, there are at least 
two important potential complications. First, even if taxpayers sometimes 
fail to notice taxes at the point of sale, it remains possible that hidden taxes 
will not overall have any significant effect on the net burden of taxation 
because taxpayers expect that there will be a hidden tax and act 
accordingly. In addition, taxpayers may quickly learn to recognize hidden 
taxes, so that any efficiency gains would be short-lived.  
A. Do Taxpayers Anticipate Hidden Taxes?  
If taxpayers anticipate that the government will have a later opportunity 
to impose unnoticed taxes, the taxpayers may behave as if tax is imposed, 
regardless of whether they can identify the subsequent tax.
120
 Indeed, we 
can extend this analysis to the possibility that if the government can give 
no guarantees that it will limit the tax it imposes, and the taxpayer believes 
she will be unable to discern tax, she may behave as though tax is imposed 
even where it is not. Thus, a universe in which the taxpayer is aware of the 
potential for hidden taxes may be even less efficient than one in which all 
taxes are visible.  
To understand this possibility it is helpful to consider the context in 
which hidden taxes are likely to produce different behavior than obvious 
taxes. Notwithstanding the startling Chetty et al. study, we should expect 
that where taxes form a component of price they will not likely affect 
short-run consumption decisions.
121
 If I am willing to pay $400 for my 
 
 
 119. Bar-Gill, supra note 109, at 758; Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 35, 40.  
 120. Finkelstein, Working Paper, supra note 15 (manuscript at 3). 
 121. Justin Marion & Erich Muehlegger, Measuring Illegal Activity and the Effects of Regulatory 
Innovation: Tax Evasion and the Dyeing of Untaxed Diesel, 116 J. POL. ECON. 633, 635 n.2 (2008). 
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iPhone, I am probably willing to pay $400, whatever the components of 
the final price tag.
122
  
The more plausible scenario, then, is one in which prices are hidden at 
the time of the relevant decision.
123
 When I invest in developing my 
potential for future revenue—say, by obtaining a J.D. degree—I may be 
unaware of the effects of the AMT, payroll taxes, credit and deduction 
phaseouts and the like on my supposedly greater earning capabilities.
124
 At 
the time I decide whether or not to move to Florida, I may be unaware that 
the combination of the state’s dozens of separate sales taxes and excises 
may exceed the total tax burden, for me, of an income tax in Georgia. 
Because Georgia’s tax is more salient, it has a larger effect on my decision 
about where to relocate. But I won’t incur either state’s tax until after my 
decision is already complete.  
This latter scenario may bring to mind the literature on the competition 
for corporate charters. As Roberta Romano explains, states cannot induce 
a firm to relocate simply by offering an opportunity for superior returns, as 
through a corporate charter.
125
 Rational firms will be aware that, once 
having moved, they may be subject to being held up by the state for the 
rents (i.e., extra profits) produced by the superior charter. Accordingly, in 
order to bring in new firms, the state must credibly commit not to later 
impose confiscatory taxes.
126
  
Something of this sort may be afoot with taxpayers facing the 
possibility of low-salience taxes on future investment returns. If the 
taxpayer is aware that taxes can be hidden, but unsure if she herself is able 
to detect a tax on her decision, she may well act as if the decision would 
be subject to tax. As Finkelstein notes, the government can overcome this 
tendency by offering a credible commitment that the decision in fact is not 
taxed to the extent the taxpayer has assumed.
127
 But, in the absence of such 
assurances, taxpayers may abstain from efficient investment even if that 
 
 
 122. This Article takes no position on whether shelling out 400 bucks for a telephone with some 
cool gadgets is rational behavior. But they are very, very cool gadgets.  
 123. This story is consistent with Chetty et al. if the relevant time of decision for most consumers 
is in the aisle, rather than at the register. 
 124. Relatedly, Professor Oates surveys the limited data on whether the future tax burden of 
existing debt is fully impounded in housing prices. Oates, supra note 8, at 76–77. 
 125. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 225, 235–50 (1985). For later elaboration, see Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate 
Law, 162 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 134, 150 (2006); Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. 
MacIntosh, The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 141, 147–48 (2000). 
 126. Romano, supra note 125, at 235–36. 
 127. Finkelstein, Working Paper, supra note 15 (manuscript at 3–4). 
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investment in fact is not taxed, just as corporations may refuse to 
reincorporate in Delaware, irrespective of potential gains.  
In the absence of central coordination, credible commitments may be 
rare. As a general rule, individual politicians cannot credibly commit not 
to raise taxes, because the immediate rewards of fulfilling their personal 
policy goals are likely to be larger than any discounted future reputational 
costs.
128
 Further, if local officials are judged by the yardstick of the 
tax/service basket offered by neighbors, each jurisdiction will have 
incentives to hide their own taxes to appear to be a better bargain to their 
electorate and potential investors.
129
 Political parties, which are long-term 
repeat players dependant on their reputations, are more believable.
130
 But 
there is a large degree of slack between parties and their elected officials, 
especially between national parties and local officials.
131
 If the public is 
aware of this slack, then at first cut we should expect taxpayers to respond 
anticipatorily to taxes they cannot directly perceive. 
In fact, though, there are other significant problems with the 
anticipation story, especially if the unintentional theory of hidden taxes 
proves the most prevalent one. First, if taxpayers do not compute the effect 
of tax because the computation is beyond their cognitive ability, they 
probably cannot perform the computation anticipatorily, either.  
Second, where taxpayers are irrational the anticipation scenario appears 
to assume taxpayers in a strange twilight of partial self-awareness. In order 
to anticipate a hidden tax that may never arise, the taxpayers must be 
aware of the likelihood of their own inability to accurately process tax 
information. At the same time, they must expect that they will not be able 
to in turn leverage that awareness into an effective strategy for ―de-
biasing,‖ or overcoming the cognitive shortcoming.132 Still, this may not 
be wildly implausible. Some data indicate that individuals may be aware 
both of their own self-control problems and their inability to overcome 
them.
133
 Rather than curbing the self-indulgent behavior, the individual 
 
 
 128. See Gilat Levy, A Model of Political Parties, 115 J. ECON. THEORY 250, 251 (2002); see also 
Enriqueta Arigones et al., Political Reputations and Campaign Promises 3 (Jan. 10, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~apostlew/paper/pdf/APP09-2005.pdf). 
 129. See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and 
Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 26 (1995). On yardstick competition generally, see 
Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 319–27 (1985). 
 130. Levy, supra note 128, at 253, 269; see also Daron Acemoglu, Why not a Political Coase 
Theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and Politics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 620, 622 (2003). 
 131. James M. Snyder, Jr. & Michael M. Ting, An Informational Rationale for Political Parties, 
46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 90, 91 (2002). 
 132. Bar-Gill, supra note 109, at n.49, 779. 
 133. Benabou & Tirole, supra note 13, at 139; Read et al., supra note 96, at 189–90. 
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pre-commits to a second-best outcome in which she will not be tempted.
134
 
A decision not to invest, in the face of potential hidden and undiscoverable 
tax liability, could be a form of binding oneself to the mast. Other 
taxpayers, though, may never be aware that they underestimate their 
taxes.
135
 For decisions made by these taxpayers, at least, hidden taxes 
should reduce deadweight losses.  
Turning to intentional tax-ignorers, here again only a select few 
taxpayers will likely anticipate a hidden tax. Recall that 
consumer/taxpayers may reduce their response to an opaque tax out of a 
desire to avoid cognitive effort.
136
 If so, and this response is simply a 
rational comparison of the utility of mental effort against the expected 
value of fully-informed consumption decisions, then a taxpayer’s 
anticipation of the tax will do little to change the result. Either the 
calculation is worth the effort, or it is not. If anything, anticipation would 
reduce the likelihood that the taxpayer will undertake any effort, since the 
present discounted value of the correct consumption decision will diminish 
with the greater lead time between the calculation and the time of 
consumption and resulting budget changes.
137
  
On the other hand, if it is possible to economize on future calculations 
with an anticipatory calculation, then of course anticipation might increase 
responsiveness to the tax. This is a difficult scenario for which to imagine 
examples, but perhaps it might describe a choice to reside in a jurisdiction 
with low or no sales taxes, or a selection of a business method that 
demands fewer rather than more purchases. In those rare cases, the 
taxpayer can economize on a large bundle of later calculations by making 
one gestalt estimate in advance.
138
 However, the mental process of 
determining when anticipation would be worthwhile is itself costly, so that 
taxpayers may sometimes pass up chances to make effort-saving 
anticipatory calculations.
139
 Thus, the degree to which taxpayers anticipate 
hidden taxes, and the forms of tax they anticipate, may depend on what 
causes the behavioral effects of hidden tax for that individual.  
 
 
 134. George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Self-Control, in CHOICE OVER TIME 187–88 (George F. 
Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992); Gruber & Mullainathan, supra note 107, at 20; DellaVigna, 
supra note 13, at 5–6. On pre-commitment strategies generally, see JON ELSTER, ODYSSEUS AND THE 
SIRENS 36–111 (1979). 
 135. Cf. Gruber & Mullainathan, supra note 107, at 20–21 (arguing that the authors’ findings fit 
best with models in which individuals are unaware of the extent of their own self-control problems). 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 102–10. 
 137. See Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, supra note 12, at 4. 
 138. For analysis of a similar possibility in the context of legislative decisions, see Brian Galle, 
Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1366–67 (2008). 
 139. Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, supra note 12, at 5.  
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In any event, if we can expect any taxpayers to anticipate hidden taxes, 
it remains possible that they will estimate fairly small tax increases. Under 
this theory, taxpayers should change their behavior in response not to the 
current perceived tax rate, but the largest anticipated hidden tax. As I 
explore in the next section, we can likely expect, at most, relatively small 
increases in overall tax levels as a result of hidden taxes. If that is accurate, 
it likely will cabin, but probably not eliminate, the potential for taxpayer 
anticipated responses to hidden taxes. Taxpayers may still be deterred 
from committing to behaviors that would be subject to tax, to an extent 
similar to the distortions that would attend a fully visible tax. By reducing 
the size of the largest likely hidden tax, the constraints make it somewhat 
less likely that hidden taxes will significantly magnify distortions.  
In short, there is thus far a theoretical possibility that hidden taxes can 
reduce deadweight losses. Taxpayer anticipation of hidden taxes would 
eliminate these welfare gains. But it is unclear whether any significant 
number of taxpayers in fact are aware of their own irrationality and are 
capable of acting rationally in response. Moreover, the danger of very 
large welfare losses from anticipated hidden taxes appears somewhat 
limited.  
In addition, if anticipatory responses prove a major barrier to the 
usefulness of hidden taxes, there are policy interventions that can mitigate 
the anticipation problem. For example, we might require each jurisdiction 
to disclose its total tax burden, broken down by taxpayer demographics. 
This would keep individual tax instruments hidden, while setting an upper 
limit on the degree to which any given activity is subject to tax. The 
disclosure regime would also largely remove the negative externality 
hidden taxes impose (via yardstick comparisons) on neighboring officials, 
increasing the credibility of official promises not to impose such taxes.  
B. Learning and De-biasing  
Another possible qualification to the basic claim that hidden taxes 
increase welfare is the possibility that taxes might not remain hidden. 
Individuals who bear economic burdens as a result of their biases have an 
incentive to correct their misperceptions.
140
 If individuals can readily de-
bias themselves then any welfare gains from hidden taxes are likely to be 
 
 
 140. Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and 
Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1647–48 (2006); Libor Dušek, Do Governments Grow 
When They Become More Efficient? Evidence from Tax Withholding 12 (Feb. 12, 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://www.cerge.cuni.cz/pdf/events/papers/030225_t.pdf). 
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fleeting. Obviously, this is a qualification that is most pertinent for the 
unintentional model of hidden tax.  
The possibility of de-biasing rests on taxpayer access to good sources 
of feedback.
141
 Absent some hint that their perceptions are inaccurate, 
biased taxpayers have no way of knowing that they are misperceiving 
reality. At present, we do not know how self-aware biased taxpayers are. 
There is, though, some limited empirical data from other related fields, 
which I will return to momentarily.  
Of course, people can learn by word of mouth as well as through their 
own experiences.
142
 This mechanism, too, has its problems. Peers who are 
not biased can be cross-subsidized by those who are; that is, the unbiased 
may benefit at the expense of their fellows.
143
 For example, the general 
public may pay a lower overall rate because some subgroup 
disproportionately fails to avoid the tax. As a result, those who see clearly 
may have financial incentives to keep their knowledge to themselves.
144
 
And where learning depends on personal characteristics of the taxpayer, 
such as their own willpower, information from others may not be very 
useful.
145
  
Even with feedback, taxpayers may misunderstand the lessons of their 
experience. Some signals are ―noisy‖—they arrive mixed together with 
other information.
146
 Taxpayers who do not fully understand what 
happened to them, whether because the signal is noisy or because their 
own perception is faulty, may not recognize feedback or may fail to use it 
properly.
147
 Confirmation bias, the tendency to take in new information 
selectively to reinforce prior decisions, in particular may be a serious 
obstacle to learning.
148
  
 
 
 141. See Benabou & Tirole, supra note 13, at 139; Klick & Mitchell, supra note 140, at 1632–34; 
Sumit Agarwal et al., Learning in the Credit Card Market 3, 17 (Feb. 8, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1091623). 
 142. Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 104, at 40; Sausgruber & Tyran, supra note 66, at 3. 
 143. See Agarwal et al., Age of Reason, supra note 105, at 37 n.29. 
 144. Agarwal et al., Age of Reason, supra note 105, at 37 n.29. This dynamic points up one 
problem with some of the laboratory studies. For instance, in Sausgruber & Tyran, supra note 66, at 3, 
the authors find that group deliberation sometimes improves participants’ ability to spot a hidden tax. 
But, unlike the real world, participants in the study did not have any way to benefit from the fact that 
they were better at spotting taxes than their fellows. E.g., id. at 6 (noting that participants were told 
that tax revenues were not returned to them or anyone else in study).  
 145. Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 8–9. 
 146. Klick & Mitchell, supra note 140, at 1633; DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 50–51; see Jennifer 
L. Romich, Difficult Calculations: Low-Income Workers and Marginal Tax Rates, 80 SOC. SERV. REV. 
27, 52 (2006) (setting out factors that make learning difficult for low-income workers, such as multiple 
overlapping phaseouts and highly individualized rules determining them). 
 147. Sausgruber & Tyran, supra note 66, at 3. 
 148. Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Misperception in Choosing Medicare Drug Plans 18 (Aug. 25, 2008) 
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Taxpayers who lack feedback cues can potentially also be de-biased by 
others, such as policy entrepreneurs. Political rivals of the incumbent tax-
setters may reveal hidden taxes in order to activate opposition to the 
existing distribution of tax burdens.
149
 On the other hand, in commercial 
settings, competitors have sometimes chosen not to de-bias their rivals’ 
clienteles.
150
 Rivals may prefer not to de-bias in order to maintain their 
own opportunities for extracting rents from the biased consumer.
151
 
Conceivably, this same dynamic could be true in the political market.
152
 
Additionally, to the extent that de-biasing does create market opportunities 
for competitors, it likely creates those same opportunities for all 
competitors, giving rise to a free-rider problem.
153
 In that instance, there is 
no market actor with an incentive to provide consumers with more 
accurate information about the costs and benefits of their consumption 
choices. 
This free-rider story may be somewhat less true of political actors. As 
with voter ignorance more generally, taxpayer biases create opportunities 
for political entrepreneurs to supply information to the voter in exchange 
for political rewards.
154
 Free rider effects at times will be diminished in the 
political context because of the limited space for competition.
155
 For 
instance, if I am running to oust an incumbent governor, I may well wish 
to reveal to the public the full extent of their tax burden. There will be 
 
 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington University Law Review) (stating that elderly 
medicare recipients tended not to switch from suboptimal plans, partly due to confirmation bias).  
 149. See Donald Wittman, Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1395, 
1400 (1989). Thus, in the likely event that hidden taxes are not perfectly distributed throughout the 
population (about which more in Part IV), entrepreneurs may opportunistically de-bias even in the 
event that hidden taxes do not change the overall tax level. 
 150. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505, 506–07 (2006).  
 151. See id. at 508–09 & n.9, 519–20; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: A Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 336–37 (2001) 
(noting that a manufacturer that educates consumers about safety features of rival products can also 
reduce demand for its own).  
 152. Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the 
“SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 820–21 (2008). But see Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, 
On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1210, 1212 (1995) (arguing that 
voters cannot be persistently fooled). Note that in order for hidden taxes to persist, they need not fool 
the same people over time; all that is needed is for new taxpayers to encounter and fail to recognize the 
hidden tax.  
 153. Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer 
Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 527 (1981); Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 150, at 525–27; Bar-
Gill, supra note 55, at 10. For some qualifications to the free-rider story, see Richard A. Epstein, 
Behavioral Economics: Human Error and Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 120 (2006). 
 154. See Coate & Morris, supra note 152, at 1230; Wittman, supra note 149, at 1400. 
 155. Cf. Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 150, at 527 (―[S]hrouding is more pervasive when the 
market is less competitive.‖). 
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relatively few other politicians (assuming, as is almost universally true in 
the United States, that there is no serious third-party candidate) who can 
benefit in the near term from that disclosure to nearly the degree I would, 
so there is no one upon whose efforts I can free ride. Even where there is 
potential for free riding, being among the first to reveal information about 
hidden taxes might be valuable as a form of branding, in much the same 
way that being seen as an ―innovator‖ might be a spur to local officials to 
be first movers even in the presence of large beneficial spillovers.
156
  
Entrepreneurs do, however, face a credibility problem. False claims 
about hidden taxes are so difficult to discern that entrepreneurs cannot 
credibly commit to telling the truth.
157
 This is likely the case under both 
the intentional- and unintentional-tax-ignorer theories of hidden taxes. 
Unintentional taxpayers by definition lack the ability to verify the 
entrepreneurs’ claims. If they are aware of their shortcomings, they will 
distrust claims by would-be entrepreneurs. Rational taxpayers, too, will 
not engage in the effort to verify entrepreneurs’ claims, because, also by 
definition, it is not worth the necessary mental effort to do so. And both 
groups will be subject to the usual free-rider problems of public choice 
theory.
158
  
Of course, not all voters will themselves recognize this dynamic. But 
even those who do not will typically be confronted with conflicting claims 
from entrepreneurs and their political targets.
159
 The taxpayers’ inability to 
recognize which denials are true will greatly diminish the effectiveness of 
any efforts at de-biasing.  
In sum, this is yet another theoretical point with no clear conclusion, 
and room for important empirical work. The evidence so far, in studies of 
other forms of consumer behavior, implies a fair bit of learning among 
consumers; although learning is slow, often forgotten, and eventually 
 
 
 156. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking & Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 614 (1980). For some qualifications to the reputational story, see Brian Galle & 
Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 57 
EMORY L.J. 1333, 1346–98 (2009). 
 157. Coate & Morris, supra note 152, at 1230. That is, voters may simply refuse to credit 
politicians who in effect must ask, ―Who you gonna believe? Me, or your own eyes?‖ DUCK SOUP 
(Paramount Pictures 1933).  
 158. In brief, the theory is that there is a free rider effect among voters, which diminishes as the 
affected group shrinks, information becomes more readily available, and the size of the effect of a 
given policy on the relevant group increases. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 21–2, 31, 35 (1971). Thus, voters who stand to gain a 
large benefit at the expense of a small, hidden, widely dispersed cost to other voters are likely to 
prevail, as they will be very active lobbyists while the victims of the policy will be indifferent. Id.  
 159. That is, in all likelihood politicians accused of imposing hidden taxes will deny it.  
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swamped by the cognitive effects of aging.
160
 For example, Agarwal et al. 
report that consumers learn well in the short term, forget the lessons of the 
recent past in the medium term, but over the long term cumulatively do 
manage to lower their costs of borrowing.
161
 In a separate study, they find 
that, controlling for income, individual fixed effects, and the like, the 
average price consumers pay for credit is U-shaped over an age 
distribution.
162
 That is, young and old pay more for similar credit products 
than those who are middle-aged. They argue that this pattern can be 
explained by a combination of learning over a lifetime and declining 
cognitive powers, producing a peak point in middle age.
163
 Whether these 
results translate to the tax field remains an open question.  
On the whole, it appears as though the basic story of efficient hidden 
taxes holds up reasonably well. The contours of the story do vary 
considerably depending on the rationality or irrationality of taxpayers. But 
tax-anticipatory behavior seems somewhat limited, and there are both 
theoretical and empirical bases for concluding that a fair segment of the 
taxpaying public will neglect the effects of hidden taxes.  
IV. POTENTIAL WELFARE LOSSES FROM HIDDEN TAXATION 
While low-salience taxes have the potential to diminish deadweight 
losses, there are also several possible countervailing effects. I have already 
mentioned that, as the literature has recognized, hidden taxes can cause 
consumers to misallocate their budgets, resulting in welfare losses.
164
 In 
this Part, I add two additional sources of potential welfare losses. First, 
because government policy is not set by unanimous consent, distortions in 
the decisions of the outcome-determining voters can reduce welfare for 
everyone. Or, put in a more familiar way, where taxes are hidden, 
 
 
 160. James J. Choi et al., Reinforcement Learning and Savings Behavior 4 (Yale Int’l Ctr. For 
Fin., Working Paper No. 09-01, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1014655; Agarwal et al., Age of Reason, supra note 105, at 2, 27; Agarwal et al., supra 
note 141, at 2–3, 17; see also Morwitz et al., supra note 47, at 9 (discussing growing consumer 
awareness of hidden fees). In several studies of consumer response to shipping fees, more experienced 
customers performed no better than beginners at spotting hidden fees. Cheema, supra note 117; Clark 
& Ward, supra note 49. 
 161. Agarwal et al., supra note 141, at 3. 
 162. Agarwal et al., Age of Reason, supra note 105, at 2; see also Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 
150, at 522–23.  
 163. Agarwal et al., Age of Reason, supra note 105, at 27–29. Alternatively, they mention in 
passing that their results may be at least partly driven by access to advice from an individual’s social 
network. Id. at 29 n.22. Which story proves right does not seem to be important to the hidden tax 
results.  
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 92–96. 
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government may be larger than optimal. Second, this paper adds to the 
literature by considering possible welfare effects of the incidence of 
hidden taxes. If hidden taxes are mostly paid by the poor, they will likely 
reduce overall social welfare; I argue here that whether that is true turns on 
the cognitive mechanisms that drive hidden taxation.  
A. Too Much Government? 
So far we have assumed that hidden taxes do not affect the total tax 
revenues taken in by government. It has long been argued, though, that 
where taxes are less salient, political opposition to self-serving tax 
increases by government officials will also decline, leading to over-
provision of government.
165
 This argument is quite similar to the Chetty et 
al. claim about distortions in consumer choice: here, the distortion is in the 
voter’s choice of how much government expenditure to consume. The 
difference is that it is not only the individual consumer who is affected by 
excess government, but also everyone who pays taxes. Moreover, if 
government power to tax is limited by competition with other 
governments, then excess taxation in one jurisdiction or tier of government 
may lead to over-taxation in others.
166
 In short, in the special case of 
consumption of government services, the individual’s failure to observe a 
tax creates a possible negative externality for others.
167
 There are a number 
of uncertainties behind this hypothesis, however.  
First, the externality argument assumes that the decision by one person 
to consume a certain amount of government services affects the amount of 
services others receive. This is a plausible assumption in many cases for 
government provision of public goods in democracies. For example, a 
common model of how governments determine the amount of government 
goods to provide is that they attempt to match the preferences of the 
median voter, the voter exactly in the middle of the range of all voter 
preferences.
168
  
 
 
 165. See supra note 7. 
 166. See Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High 
Tax Rates?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 363, 364–65 (2002). 
 167. Thus, we should predict that intentional tax-ignorers will ignore taxes where it would 
maximize social welfare for them to pay attention. Similarly, unintentional tax-ignorers will under-
invest (from a societal perspective) in de-biasing efforts.  
 168. For a general discussion and a review of the empirical evidence supporting the median voter 
theory, see Roger D. Congleton, The Median Voter Model, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
CHOICE 382, 382–86 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004). 
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Yet median voter theory is ambiguous as to whether a change in 
salience will alter tax levels. Imagine that voters are aligned left to right in 
order of increasing preference for tax. Lower salience will tend to shift 
voters to the left. However, if these shifts do not move any voters across 
the unbiased median—for instance, if everyone who is biased is to the left 
or far to the right of the median—then there will be no change in the 
expressed preferences for the size of government.  
Alternatives to the median voter model are also theoretically 
indeterminate on the effect of hidden taxes. Buchanan argues, famously, 
that under so-called ―public choice‖ assumptions, in which intensity of 
voter interest matters to the political outcome, lower tax salience will 
increase tax rates.
169
 He claims that diminished visibility of taxes will 
increase the likelihood that individual taxpayers will free-ride on the 
efforts of others to oppose any tax increase.
170
  
But this analysis overlooks two key points. For one, Buchanan appears 
to assume that voters will be unaware that taxes are hidden from others. If 
a rational voter predicts that others will not act because they do not notice 
the tax, that rational voter will conclude she cannot free ride on the efforts 
of the ignorant others and thus will be more motivated to act herself. Thus, 
if taxes are hidden from some but less than all of the population, political 
opposition might actually rise.
171
  
 Secondly, Buchanan takes for granted that hidden taxes will only 
deactivate tax opponents. Some voters, though, might prefer higher 
 
 
 169. Buchanan, supra note 59, at 135. 
 170. Id.; see also BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 17, at 24–32 (making this argument about 
voter ignorance of taxes more generally). 
 171. It might be argued in response that in a repeated lobbying game, taxpayers will still not 
lobby. The idea is that if I lobby, you will be able to observe my lobbying behavior, and therefore 
learn that there are hidden taxes. We then will be back in a world where taxes are not hidden, and 
neither of us lobbies. Anticipating this, I do not lobby.  
 The game plays out differently, however, if (as seems likely) it is possible for me to hide my 
lobbying activity from you. In that case, my best strategy is both to lobby and to hide my lobbying. 
The reason is that, if we cannot observe one another’s mental states, you may think that taxes are 
hidden from me. If you do not see me lobby, you, too, might lobby. Hiding my lobbying from you 
therefore increases the chances you will provide me with additional lobbying against an unwanted tax. 
However, since there is only a possibility that you will lobby, I still must exert some lobbying effort 
myself.  
 Another possible objection to my lobbying analysis in the main text is that those who do lobby 
may do so only for their own benefit. Thus, special interests from whom taxes are not hidden might 
lobby simply for carve-outs for themselves, shifting the tax burden to those from whom tax is hidden. 
(I am grateful to Tom Griffith for making this point). This strikes me as entirely plausible. A possible 
solution, though, would be to make special-purpose carveouts more difficult, as by requiring them to 
be enacted through very clear statutory language. See Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax 
Shelter Regulation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 357, 381–85 (2006). In that way, any special-interest lobbying 
would be more likely to benefit the population as a whole. 
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taxes—for example, those who know that they themselves will pay little. 
Hiding taxes from these voters will diminish public support for these kinds 
of redistributions, thereby reducing tax levels.  
A second set of uncertainties is centered around the possibility that 
lower tax salience may interfere with some of the mechanisms thought to 
constrain government opportunities to impose higher taxes. Under the so-
called ―Leviathan‖ theories of government tax-setting, competition 
between governments for mobile citizens limits the rate at which 
government officials can self-interestedly expand the tax base.
172
 
Evidently the assumption is that at least some citizens who individually 
lack the power to exercise their political voice in opposition to a tax may 
nonetheless be alert enough to their fiscal situation to exit an undesirable 
regime.
173
 A low-salience tax would arguably diminish the efficacy of this 
exit constraint, either by further reducing the degree to which taxpayers 
became aware of their own jurisdiction’s high taxes, or increasing the 
likelihood that they would unwittingly relocate to another jurisdiction that 
itself had high, hidden taxes. On the other hand, hidden taxes might 
diminish the rewards, if any, for a jurisdiction that sought to attract those 
that preferred higher taxes. Similarly, if voters determine the appropriate 
size of their own government by reference to ―yardsticks‖ in other 
jurisdictions, the prevalence of hidden taxes at home or in neighboring 
locales would distort accurate measurements.
174
 Some, but not necessarily 
all, of these distortions might be in the direction of higher taxes.  
Hidden taxes can potentially also interfere with tax-setting in a pure 
Tiebout model, under which government officials are not necessarily self-
interested.
175
 Rather, the officials simply are the first-movers in a Lindahl-
like tax-setting mechanism, with officials in each jurisdiction offering a 
basket of goods and services, and in which taxpayers reveal their 
 
 
 172. BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 17, at 203–12. For overviews of the literature, see John 
Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 269, 291, 296–98 (1999); Jeffery S. 
Zax, Is There a Leviathan in Your Neighborhood?, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 560–67 (1989). 
 173. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 17, at 206–07 (assuming that taxpayers can exit 
regime in response to tax). One argument offered in defense of this assumption is that free-riding is 
more pervasive for ―voice‖ than for ―exit.‖ See Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and 
Constitutional Design, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 11–15, on file with 
the Washington University Law Review). That is, voting or otherwise participating in local 
government produces externalities for others, leading to free riding. A migrant who learns negative 
information about her government, on the other hand, can act on that information by moving to a new 
jurisdiction, thereby capturing for herself most of the gains from that information. Id. If, however, out-
migration is an important source of information to those who remain or might follow, there is still a 
large positive externality even for exit.  
 174. On yardstick competition generally, see Besley & Case, supra note 129, at 26. 
 175. See supra note 16. 
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preferences by selecting their most preferred basket.
176
 As I have argued 
elsewhere, hidden taxes, taken in combination with other frictions on 
relocation, can create complex interactions with the Tiebout mechanism.
177
 
In general, it is likely that taxpayers will end up in a jurisdiction that fails 
to match their preferences. It is entirely possible that in some cases this 
distortion may be in the direction of too little government rather than too 
much government.  
Adding to these uncertainties is that it can be argued in response to the 
Leviathan, yardstick, and Tiebout points that government services, too, 
can have low salience.
178
 Certainly the variety of benefits individuals 
receive from government is broken up into hundreds of different 
programs. There is experimental evidence that the disaggregation bias also 
results in undervaluation of government benefits.
179
 Thus, perhaps the low 
salience of some taxes in effect restores, rather than itself breaking, the 
politics of tax setting.
180
  
Whatever the reality of these possibilities, there may be still yet other 
limits on the size of government that could mitigate any externality from 
hidden taxes. If voters vote based on their overall welfare, and hidden 
taxes permit taxation at a level higher than the voters would otherwise 
have preferred, then even if they do not observe tax levels directly they 
may still punish officials for diminishing their basket of private goods. 
There is mixed evidence, though, about whether voters in fact engage in 
this form of ―retrospective‖ voting.181  
Finally, even if hidden taxes do pose a danger of a government sector 
that is too large, or otherwise inefficiently allocated, that danger can be 
mitigated by other policy tools. Again, detailed disclosure of the total tax 
burden could improve inter-jurisdictional competition; certainly it would 
reduce the danger that voters will not be aware of the cost of their basket 
of government services.
182
 States might also adopt fairly stringent 
 
 
 176. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 446–56. 
 177. Galle, supra note 152, at 824–30. 
 178. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 100. 
 179. McCaffery & Baron, Political Psychology, supra note 62, at 1768–72.  
 180. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 100 (making this point about ―fiscal illusion‖ 
more generally). 
 181. See Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, The Politics of Ambiguity, 105 Q. J. ECON. 829, 842 
(1990); Guido Suurmond et al., On the Bad Reputation of Reputational Concerns, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 
2817, 2830 (2004); see generally R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, INFORMATION AND ELECTIONS (1998) 
(surveying theories of how voters collect and apply information about candidates); MORRIS P. 
FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981) (same). 
 182. Admittedly, there is substantial room for gamesmanship in any such disclosure. Officials 
could shift taxes to other forms, such as user fees or regulatory burdens, in an effort to evade 
identifying them. The best that one can say at this stage is that effective implementation would likely 
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balanced-budget requirements, super-majority rules for new taxes, or the 
like. If these tools prove ineffective, we might employ hidden taxes only at 
the federal level. By most accounts, the various tax competition methods 
are rather less significant at the national scale, because the costs of exit, at 
least for individuals, are too large.
183
 Using only national-level hidden 
taxes would thus avoid a number of the allocational distortions I have 
mentioned.  
B. Empirics on Size of Government 
Given the confusing state of our theoretical predictions about the effect 
of hidden taxes on the size of government expenditures, it would be 
helpful to have good empirical data on the question. Unfortunately, the 
literature on whether the saliency of taxation affects the size of 
government is inconclusive.  
In his comprehensive 1988 survey, Oates found that ―the existing 
empirical literature has not as yet made a persuasive case for the[] 
existence‖ of what he called ―fiscal illusion—the notion that the 
systematic misperception of key fiscal parameters may significantly distort 
fiscal choices by the electorate.‖184 Oates noted that some studies had 
found that more ―complex‖ tax systems were correlated with high tax 
burdens.
185
 But he argued that the causation might run in the opposite 
direction from that suggested by fiscal illusion. Preferences for high taxes 
produced complex tax structures, he said, because each jurisdiction 
competes with its neighbors, so that high sales or property taxes would 
drive away consumers or home-buyers, respectively.
186
 Thus, to obtain 
large revenues, a local jurisdiction necessarily had to have a complex, 
many-pronged financing system. One could extend Oates’s argument 
further, by noting that low marginal rates on many sources are more 
efficient than a single, high rate on one source.
187
 These alternative 
explanations thus far confound efforts to show any relation between voter 
confusion over complex tax schemes and high taxes. And other empirical 
 
 
require a vigilant, neutral third party. That is not, in my view, the same as saying that there will be no 
effective implementation.  
 183. E.g., WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 8 (1972). 
 184. Oates, supra note 8, at 65–66. 
 185. Id. at 69–70. 
 186. Id. at 70–71. 
 187. Cf. Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1003, 1006–1011 (2001) (making this point in support of argument for using non-tax 
redistributive tools). 
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efforts, Oates reported, were simply too mixed to draw strong 
conclusions.
188
  
Dollery and Worthington, too, after surveying the literature find no 
convincing connection between the visibility of a public finance system 
and the size of government.
189
 A common theme they report is the 
difficulty of specifying an accurate measure of tax salience. For example, 
both the complexity of the revenue system and the ease with which 
revenues can be increased without rate hikes (―revenue-elasticity‖) have 
eluded easy measurement.
190
 And they conclude that the so-called ―renter 
illusion,‖ in which property taxes are higher where there are more renters 
(putatively because renters are less attentive to the tax rate), can also be 
explained by rational behavior by renters.
191
  
Finkelstein frames her discussion as an inquiry into whether electronic 
toll collection increases the size of government but in her more detailed 
discussion is careful to limit her claim to showing only that toll rates 
increased.
192
 Without more complete budget information about the toll-
imposing jurisdictions, we do not know whether increased toll revenue 
was offset with tax reductions elsewhere.  
Martin and Gabay suggest a possible reason for these inconclusive 
results. In order for low salience to translate to higher tax rates and bigger 
government, they argue, citizens must fail to connect their tax burden to 
their vote for office.
193
 Taxes that have no effect on purchases may still 
alter voting.
194
 For example, sales taxes included in the posted price, such 
as U.S. gas taxes, are taken into account at purchase but may not inform 
voters about the extent of their tax burden. Earlier studies may have 
considered all hidden taxes together, confounding their results.
195
 
Moreover, the possibility that taxes are hidden from consumers but not 
voters implies that, whatever the welfare effects of taxes that are hidden 
politically, a tax that was hidden from consumers but not voters could be 
purely welfare-increasing.  
 
 
 188. Oates, supra note 8, at 72–78. 
 189. Dollery & Worthington, supra note 12, at 293–94. 
 190. Id. at 270, 277. 
 191. Id. at 287–89. 
 192. Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 36. 
 193. Martin & Gabay, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
 194. Id. at 5; see also Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 5 (making same point).  
 195. Martin & Gabay, supra note 8, at 6–7. However, a major problem with Martin & Gabay’s 
own findings on the connection between government size and visibility, id. at 13, is that they appear 
not to control for the regressivity of the tax. It seems a fair bet that highly regressive taxes would be 
highly unpopular with the general public, as suggested by their own anecdote about British efforts to 
impose a poll tax, id. at 3.  
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In short, there is presently no conclusive evidence to suggest that 
hidden taxes in fact increase the size of government. However, that is not 
to say that this possibility has been disproven, either.  
C. Distributional Questions 
A second major welfare question involves the likely distribution of the 
burden of hidden taxation. Increasing the difficulty of identifying the 
burden of a tax may shift its incidence, if different taxpayers differ in their 
willingness or ability to identify the tax. For instance, if the likelihood that 
a consumer will pay sales taxes rather than shift to a consumption decision 
that is not taxed correlates with lower income, then imposing hidden sales 
tax will result in a more regressive tax structure. This is similar to the 
possibility that cross-subsidization between purchasers of bundled 
consumer goods has distributive consequences.
196
 In addition to the 
obvious fairness implications these shifts in incidence raise, in the 
presence of the declining marginal utility of money they may also have 
welfare effects. In other words, if hidden taxes shift the tax burden to the 
wealthy, that shift may increase welfare, or vice-versa.  
Again, though, there are gaping holes in our current information about 
the incidence of hidden taxes. First, we do not know for certain whether 
the behavior effects of hiding taxes are largely intentional or unintentional. 
Neither do we know, if taxpayers are acting mostly unintentionally, how 
taxpayers might adapt to their own shortcomings. Both questions are 
important to the distributive inquiry. Indeed, the distributional results 
would seem completely different depending on the answers. 
1. Distribution in a Rational Loafing Model 
Consider on one hand the distributive implications of the theory that 
taxpayers rationally decide not to incur the cognitive costs of computing 
their likely tax. Once more, the central premise of that claim is that the 
taxpayer expects to come out ahead in terms of her well-being, on the 
assumption that the disutility of having to compute her tax is larger than 
the subjective present discounted value of the tax.
197
 This equation implies 
two possible reasons that hidden taxes might actually bear more heavily on 
higher-income or wealthier taxpayers, respectively. 
 
 
 196. Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 38. 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 102–10. 
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For one, higher-income taxpayers by definition have higher 
opportunity costs. Time, after all, is money.
198
 In the abstract all of the 
time a higher-income taxpayer devotes to non-income-producing activity, 
such as pondering her tax, is time she doesn’t spend earning money. Since 
her time is worth more, she is more reluctant to spend it thinking about her 
taxes, so she pays more in hidden tax. Except in the case of major life 
decisions, though, this probably is a minor consideration; most tax 
computations would take such a tiny amount of time that the value of that 
time is largely irrelevant.  
Second, the fact that taxes make less of an impact on the budgets of 
wealthier taxpayers should affect their decision whether or not to compute 
the tax. Assume for the moment that the disutility of engaging in the 
computation is either identical for all taxpayers or, as I sketched in the last 
paragraph, larger for those with higher incomes. We will engage in a 
calculation where the expected value of doing the numbers—the tax 
savings—is larger than the disutility of the calculation. When we translate 
the tax savings from dollars into utility, the diminishing marginal value of 
additional dollars will tend to shrink the welfare benefits of loafing for the 
wealthy. More plainly, to a millionaire, ten dollars in sales tax is not worth 
the effort of thinking hard, but if that ten dollars is the difference between 
buying our meds or not, we will think long and hard.  
Cutting somewhat against this second point is the possibility of 
differential time discounting. Recall that there is a time-discounting factor 
that we have to apply to the tax savings on the right-hand side of our 
equation. While we have to do our computation now, we get to enjoy the 
money we save later. If we depart somewhat from the purely rational 
model to note, as empirics suggest, that low-income taxpayers may have 
irrationally high discount rates, then this time-discounting may have 
distributive effects.
199
 Higher-wealth individuals would have a lower 
discount rate, value their future tax savings more, and therefore engage in 
less loafing.
200
 As the time between the computation and the tax savings 
 
 
 198. See Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 40 (noting that opportunity cost of time is higher for 
―wealthier‖ consumers). 
 199. On the greater patience of the wealthy, see Gary S. Becker and Casey B. Mulligan, The 
Endogenous Determination of Time Preference, 112 Q.J. ECON. 729, 750–51 (1997). 
 200. To illustrate, imagine two taxpayers, Apple and Orange. Apple has a high discount rate; the 
value to her at time T1 of a future T2 savings of $10 is $8. Orange has a lower discount rate; the value 
to her at T1 of a future T2 savings of $10 is $9. Both would experience a disutility of $1.50 from 
engaging in a calculation that would enable them to avoid tax and an additional disutility of $7 from 
switching to the less-preferred, non-taxed product. Orange engages in the calculation, buys the second-
best widget, and gets a discounted present value of $9 in tax. She comes out $.50 ahead. If Apple did 
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increases, these effects grow in significance, although for the most part 
they likely will only undercut, rather than exceed, the general effects of the 
diminishing marginal utility of wealth.  
Another regressive influence is the likelihood that the disutility of 
engaging in calculations diminishes as wealth increases. More precisely, it 
seems likely that the difficulty of carrying out mathematical operations 
declines with education, and education correlates with wealth.
201
 Wealthier 
individuals may also have computational aids, such as an accountant on 
speed-dial, that are unavailable to those of more modest means.
202
  
As with all my speculations here, it is hard to put numbers on any of 
these factors. However, it is plausible that, in the case where taxpayers 
rationally loaf on cognitive effort, hidden taxes can be more progressive, 
and hence increase overall welfare. Even if time-discounting and ease of 
computing reduce the costs of thinking about tax for the wealthy, it will 
remain the case that the utility value of cognitive effort will be very large 
for the very poor, and tiny for the very rich.  
2. Distribution in an Unintentional Ignorance Model 
We have a rather different set of factors to weigh in a world in which 
taxpayers neglect the effects of hidden taxes because at the time of the 
transaction they are incapable of noticing them, and not because they 
choose to ignore them. Here the differences between richer and poorer 
taxpayers are likely to arise, if at all, because of differences in learning and 
de-biasing.  
Most obviously, wealthier taxpayers are more likely to be able to pay 
for help in overcoming their cognitive limitations. There is at least 
anecdotal evidence that accountants, financial planners, and even 
 
 
the same, she would lose by $.50, since her tax savings would be only $8, and the costs of computing 
and switching is $8.50. So Apple pays tax and Orange does not.  
 Of course, the reader who has labored through this example may well wonder at the assumption 
that the cost of computing the cost of computing is itself costless. The literature so far has no 
particularly satisfying resolution to this iterativeness problem. Xavier Gabaix et al., Costly Information 
Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1043, 1043, 
1055 (2006). One might hope that taxpayers will have a good gut sense of when they can loaf in a way 
that improves their utility; possibly they would only loaf where the calculations were obviously very 
hard relative to the tax savings. Cf. id. at 1055 (―[A] crude myopic solution . . . may be reasonable.‖); 
Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, supra note 12, at 5 (suggesting that decisionmakers can avoid a deliberation 
cost spiral by simply proceeding on their ―best guess‖). 
 201. See Marianne Bertrand et al., Behavioral Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision 
Making Among the Poor, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 8, 13 (2006). On the connection between 
computational power and education, see Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 150, at 529. 
 202. Bar-Gill, supra note 109, at 789. 
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consumer services such as Consumer Reports have helped individuals to 
make better decisions about the ideal set of consumer purchases, 
notwithstanding efforts on the part of sellers to confuse them.
203
 Few of 
these services are free. On the other hand, it probably is not worthwhile or 
practical to obtain counseling for small transactions, so that if hidden taxes 
are used only in that context there may be little distributional effect.
204
 
Still, education seems likely to improve taxpayers capacity to observe and 
compute taxes, and, again, education is strongly correlated with wealth.
205
 
On the other hand, de-biasing depends on feedback.
206
 Individuals must 
first become aware that they are making mental errors before they can 
begin to correct them. Arguably, higher-wealth individuals might be better 
positioned to obtain feedback on the effects of their decisions by virtue of 
repetition—they simply engage in more transactions that might be 
subjected to tax, and so have more opportunities for learning. 
However, a given transaction might provide minimal information about 
tax for wealthier taxpayers because the individual is too far from her 
budget constraint.
207
 That is, it may be that what really triggers recognition 
of the impact of a hidden tax for us is the sudden realization that there isn’t 
enough money in the checking account to pay the next bill—that 
something, we know not what, has depleted our resources faster than we 
thought. Lower-wealth individuals are much closer to hitting the budget 
wall, this theory goes, and hence are more sensitive to hidden tax effects. 
This may simply be another way of saying that, because the marginal 
value of each taxed dollar is higher for those who have fewer of them, the 
feedback effect of suffering a hidden tax is larger.
208
  
This hypothesis assumes, though, that there is no external source of de-
biasing, such as political entrepreneurs, that might educate taxpayers about 
their misperceptions. Political de-biasing, if it occurs, can have a 
distributive valence.
209
 Even if the incidence of hidden taxes is distributed 
evenly or progressively across the population, de-biasing efforts by 
politicians might be skewed towards wealthier constituencies. These 
groups might be smaller and more cohesive, which would tend to make 
 
 
 203. See Epstein, supra note 109, at 813; Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 9. 
 204. Bar-Gill, supra note 109, at 758. 
 205. Cf. Epstein, supra note 109, at 812 n.48 (observing that financial advice is more useful to the 
better educated). 
 206. See supra note 140. 
 207. Cf. DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 50 (noting that individuals can misinterpret feedback when 
its results are hard to distinguish from overlapping signals).  
 208. See supra text accompanying notes 198–99. 
 209. See Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 189–90. 
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them more politically powerful, and in any event obviously would be able 
to afford to pay larger political rents.
210
 
Thus, it is likely under the unintentional model that hidden taxes are 
regressive. That obviously complicates the story in which hidden taxes are 
a remedy for the fairness/welfare dilemma. Again, though, we do not 
know for what portion of the population the unintentional model is an 
accurate description of taxpayer cognition. Under the rational model, 
hidden taxes could actually be progressive, aiding the redistributive 
project.  
V. IMPLICATIONS 
Right now hidden taxes offer mostly caveats and unknowns. In this 
Part, I will try to suggest why these unknowns loom as potentially critical 
questions of public policy. To be sure, right now this is speculative fiction. 
But my goal here is start arguments, not necessarily to finish them.  
A. Fairness vs. Welfare 
If hidden taxes do have the potential to reduce deadweight losses from 
taxation, they would transform the landscape of economic thinking about 
redistribution and tax progressivity. Existing optimal tax theory, as I noted 
at the outset, suggests that redistribution should be sharply limited in order 
to avoid changing the behavior of high-earners.
211
 If hidden taxes can 
mitigate the behavioral response of those at the top of the bracket, tax rates 
can be made much more steeply progressive without concomitant welfare 
losses. Whether or not this is feasible on a large scale, again, turns largely 
on how taxpayers will respond to substantial taxes; under a rational 
ignorance model, gains from hidden taxes will likely be modest.
212
  
Even under the unintentional model, the potential for welfare gains is 
complicated by several tradeoffs uncovered by my analysis here. Where 
taxpayers do not rationally ignore taxes, hidden taxes are likely to be 
regressive, because richer individuals will be better educated and can 
better afford unbiased tax advice.
213
 Depending on the extent of this 
regressivity and the rate at which the marginal utility of wealth decreases, 
this transfer from poor to rich may outweigh the efficiency or fairness 
 
 
 210. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax 
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 518–19 (1998).  
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 18–37. 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 102–10. 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 202–11. 
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gains of hiding an otherwise progressive tax. Thus a hidden progressive 
tax may need to direct additional government spending to the poor in order 
to achieve the preferred level of redistribution.  
Another complication of the irrational model is that increasing taxpayer 
self-awareness about the fact that there are hidden taxes both increases and 
decreases welfare. Higher self-awareness increases welfare because it 
reduces the second-order loss to the consumer from paying too much for 
the taxed good.
214
 If Tran Taxpayer knows that some of his budget is lost 
to hidden taxes, he can plan his purchases to make sure he buys his 
essentials before the checking account balance gets close to zero. Thus, it 
is more likely that the welfare gains from producer surplus and tax on each 
additional transaction Tran and his compatriots enter will outweigh the 
consumer losses, making hidden taxes more efficient. At the same time, 
self-awareness helps taxpayers to de-bias, which makes the taxes less 
hidden over time, ultimately diminishing their effectiveness.
215
 Possibly 
this conflict could be minimized by imposing hidden taxes primarily on 
behaviors that are rarely repeated, such as home sales, or on taxpayers who 
have little time to put their lessons to use—students216 or the elderly.217 
But that would greatly limit the universe of useful applications.  
While the ultimate verdict for the fairness/efficiency tradeoff is not all 
rosey under the unintentional model, it also is not completely hopeless 
under the intentional model. This project flies in with a bit of tailwind, 
since under the rational model hidden taxes probably are inherently 
progressive.
218
 As a result it might be possible to impose a large number of 
small taxes, each of which would then be mildly progressive. Targeting 
the tax to activities that correlate with wealth—an array of small luxury 
taxes, for example—would help a bit more.  
B. National vs. Local Redistribution 
Hidden taxes may also transform one of the central tenets of fiscal 
federalism, namely the idea that redistribution can only be carried out 
 
 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 92–96. 
 215. See supra text accompanying notes 140–63. 
 216. That is, the hidden tax would fall on students only while they were students. For example, 
there might be phase-outs or other complex wrinkles in tax benefits for higher education that would 
make a student’s ultimate tax burden higher than it appears.  
 217. See Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 8 n.16 (―Generally, infrequent mistakes or mistakes that 
generate infrequent feedback are less susceptible to correction by learning.‖); DellaVigna, supra note 
13, at 50–51; cf. Epstein, supra note 109, at 811, 814 (noting that feedback is more effective for 
standard, repeated transactions). 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 102–10. 
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efficiently by central governments.
219
 Mobile taxpayers with little taste for 
income equality will relocate in response to efforts to impose 
redistributive tax, leading to a race to the bottom among jurisdictions 
competing for those taxpayers.
220
 Hidden taxes may slow this race by 
concealing the effects of tax not only in the origin jurisdiction, so that 
potential migrants are less inclined to think of their current home as a bad 
deal. In addition, in a world where taxes are hidden, the costs of acquiring 
enough information to move to the right jurisdiction are higher, so that 
―locational rents‖ are higher.221 Each jurisdiction, in other words, can 
charge a higher tax rate before it is worthwhile for individuals to flee.  
Of course, taxes can also be hidden in the rival jurisdictions. Rivals, 
too, might look more enticing if the person choosing between them does 
not notice all their taxes. But that is my point, as well as the point of some 
of the existing ―Leviathan‖ literature: jurisdictions might compete more 
vigorously to hide their tax than to reduce it.
222
 The Leviathan scholars 
argue, though, that this dampened competition reduces welfare because it 
permits rent-seeking politicians to impose a tax level higher than the 
population would prefer.
223
 I return to that argument later in this Part, but 
for now I will note that it also is possible that even under rent-seeking 
hidden taxes are second-best efficient. When tax competition between two 
 
 
 219. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5 at 455; Brown & Oates, supra note 2, at 328; 
William F. Fox & John A. Swain, The Federal Role in State Taxation: A Normative Approach, 40 
NAT’L TAX J. 611, 615 (2007); Stark, supra note 2, at 1408–10.  
 220. Fox & Swain, supra note 219, at 614–15. If mobility is correlated with wealth, local taxation 
may also tend to be regressive. Id. at 615. 
 221. Cf. Galle, supra note 152, at 823 (arguing that cognitive biases increase costs of choosing 
correct jurisdiction). These costs are iterative. That is, a rational migrant will not incur the costs of a 
first move if she is aware that, after arriving at her destination, the second jurisdiction may respond by 
increasing taxes. Since the second jurisdiction’s opportunity to raise taxes is limited mostly by the 
migrant’s cost of exit, as exit costs rise, the risk of higher taxes in the second jurisdiction rises as well. 
That will, in turn, make the first move less attractive.  
 Locational rents are the total value a taxpayer realizes by living in her current jurisdiction rather 
than the next best choice. Bhajan Grewal, Locational Surplus and its Relevance for Subnational 
Taxation and Inter-governmental Grants in a Federation 166, 167–69, in TAXATION AND FISCAL 
FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RUSSELL MATTHEWS (1988). To the extent that rents measure the 
amount of tax the jurisdiction could extract, see id. at 173, they can also include the value of not 
having to move to another jurisdiction. See Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial 
Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 601–02(1983).  
 222. See MONICA PRASAD, THE POLITICS OF FREE MARKETS: THE RISE OF NEOLIBERAL 
ECONOMIC POLICIES IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 282 (2006); see also 
Fox & Swain, supra note 219, at 623 (arguing, albeit not in ―Leviathan‖ context, that jurisdictions 
have incentives to mutually export taxes to conceal tax levels from their citizens). As I explained 
earlier, it will likely be difficult for one state to compete with another by pointing out the rival’s 
hidden taxes, rather than simply hiding its own.  
 223. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in 
Federations, 5 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 177, 177 (2003). 
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states is fierce enough, both will be obliged to impose rates much lower 
than either would prefer. If hidden taxes allow officials to put higher rates 
in place, these higher rates could still be lower than the noncompetitive 
preference of either.
224
  
It might be argued that this story is largely irrelevant for entities. 
Businesses, the claim would go, typically have tax advice, and so will not 
be subject to hidden taxes.
225
 That is somewhat true under the irrational 
model. There are data, though, suggesting that executives even in large 
firms are plagued by cognitive biases in their managerial decisions.
226
 
Slack in the market for corporate control may allow these inefficiencies to 
persist even in a competitive environment.
227
 Further, under the rational 
model, hidden taxes could still be hidden when the value of computing 
them is outweighed by the disutility of the computation. Presumably, the 
corporation will hire someone to give it tax advice. Its reserve price for 
that service will be whatever its managers are willing to pay to avoid 
having to do the computation themselves. Or, put another way, trash 
hauling is a lucrative business, and some trash may be too small to be 
worth paying someone to take it away.  
C. Redistributive Instruments: Tax vs. Substantive Law 
Another aspect of redistributive theory impacted by hidden taxes is the 
question whether legal rules directly regulating conduct should be 
designed with redistributive goals, or whether instead redistribution should 
take place solely within the tax system. Kaplow and Shavell and Weisbach 
argue for the latter, asserting that the welfare losses from drafting 
inefficient but redistributive conduct rules are larger than the welfare 
 
 
 224. Cf. Galle, supra note 71, at 899–900 (noting the indeterminacy of offsetting incentives for 
officials either to meet local preferences or exploit voter’s fiscal illusions in accepting federal grants). 
 225. See On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs 
Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2123 (2008); DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 42. 
 226. Mathew L.A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large 
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 103–27 (1997) (finding that CEO 
hubris has a significant effect on the price paid for corporate acquisitions); Ulrike Malmendier & 
Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J. FIN. 
ECON. 20, 42 (2008) (finding that ―overconfident CEOs are unambiguously more likely to make 
lower-quality acquisitions when their firm has abundant internal resources‖). 
 227. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, 
CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 721 (2005); see Donald C. 
Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market 
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 149–51 (1997) (arguing that, even 
if market mechanism is effective, it may lag many years behind management errors). 
Wash U Law Repository
  
 
 
 
 
108 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:59 
 
 
 
 
losses from redistributive taxation.
228
 Sanchirico posits the opposite, 
pointing out that deadweight loss triangles increase in area in proportion to 
the square of the absolute size of the distortion, so that to minimize 
welfare losses from redistribution we should enact many small 
redistributions, rather than one large one.
229
 McCaffery and Baron have 
weighed in by noting that, to the extent that voters are irrationally averse 
to tax, it may be more efficient to redistribute using substantive legal 
rules.
230
  
Hidden taxes may undermine McCaffery and Baron’s recommendation. 
If taxes are easier to hide than redistributive substantive rules, or if the 
behavioral effects of hiding taxes are more pronounced than in other legal 
areas, then the tax system should be a more appealing site for 
redistribution. The reverse is also possible. This analysis implies, in turn, a 
need for future empirical work on the salience and incidence of the 
redistributive aspects of redistributive legal rules.
231
  
D. Prices: Tax-Inclusive or Tax-Exclusive? 
On a more pragmatic note, this project sheds some light on current 
controversies over the design of sales taxes and the VAT here and in 
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(2003) (pointing out that it may be easier to enact redistribution through judicial rules than through tax 
legislation).  
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UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1748–90 (2005). For evidence suggestive of tax antipathy, see id. at 1759–61; 
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avoid paying tax is best characterized as an ―irrational‖ aversion to tax, such that a government planner 
should not take that desire into account in measuring social welfare, or whether instead it is simply a 
―preference‖ not to pay taxes. On preferences for the way in which goods are delivered, see Douglas 
A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of 
Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 580–624 (2004). 
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Europe.
232
 In the United States, prices (other than prices for gasoline) are 
usually stated exclusive of tax; in Europe, the norm is often that posted 
prices include VAT.
233
 My discussion here implies that the welfare-
maximizing rule would be a mix of tax-inclusive and exclusive prices for 
different goods.
234
 Under either the rational or irrational model, hidden 
taxes may either increase or decrease welfare, depending on the relative 
elasticities of supply and demand and the progressivity or regressivity of 
the tax once hidden. A blanket rule therefore will hide taxes in some cases 
where it would increase welfare to reveal them, or vice-versa.  
E. Democracy vs. Welfare  
Another fertile area for debate occasioned by hidden taxes will be in 
government theory. Hidden taxes, after all, amount to government by 
deception. A rich literature already explores the basic questions of 
transparency and government paternalism: the wisdom and legitimacy of 
government decisions made out of public sight but supposedly for the 
public good.
235
 In many cases this debate is waged on what amount to pure 
welfare or other instrumentalist grounds. Opaque government is usually 
rejected because it is corrupt or self-serving, or, by frustrating citizen 
input, may lack full information about public preferences and policy 
alternatives.
236
 These are welfarist, or at least instrumentalist, arguments. 
 
 
 232. For a discussion of the debate, see Richard F. Bird, Value-Added Taxes and Excises: 
Commentary, in REPORT OF A COMMISSION ON REFORMING THE TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
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 234. I assume, in line with the Chetty et al. study, that a tax-exclusive price results in the tax being 
hidden.  
 235. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, 3–374 (1986); 
Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1264–73 (2004); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass 
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 173, 196–98 (1997); 
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1650–73 
(1995); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 237–54 (1998); see also 
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But supposing it were the case that hidden taxes unambiguously were 
welfare-increasing, what would political theory then imply about their 
sharp conflict with participatory democracy? There obviously is much to 
say on this front, but I will suggest here only a few preliminary points.  
In all likelihood, our view of the welfare/democracy tradeoff will 
depend on whether we have an instrumentalist or deontological view of 
democracy. That is, suppose (in the deontological approach) that our view 
of democracy is that it is inherently valuable, irrespective of its welfare 
effects. Perhaps democracy and deliberation are fundamental expressions 
of human identity.
237
 Or perhaps participation rights are primary goods so 
fundamental to our well-being that we would not, ex ante, willingly trade 
off them against any other instrumental gains.
238
 These approaches would 
probably be fairly hostile to hidden taxation. But as others have observed, 
many theories of democracy are rather indeterminate in their prescription 
for just how thoroughly democratic government must be.
239
 Can elected 
officials delegate decisions to others? Some decisions but not others? 
Rawls’s view, for example, apparently was that participation rights are 
satisfied so long as citizens would agree that the overarching structure of 
democratic decision-making is fair and representative; decisions made 
within that framework then are presumptively also fair.
240
  
The instrumentalist democracy advocate may be more accepting of 
hidden taxes, although her view may depend on the surrounding 
government structure. The welfarist worry about hidden taxes (aside from 
the possible welfare losses I canvassed earlier) is that they facilitate self-
dealing by officials.
241
 If citizens do not know they are paying money to 
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the government, it is much easier for officials to use that money for their 
own purposes.
242
 Note, though, that the problem is not with the tax system 
itself, but instead with the use of the tax proceeds. Thus, assuming we 
could remedy self-dealing on the spending side, hidden taxes might still be 
preferable to others. So a regime of hidden taxation should be 
accompanied by a set of strict rules for disclosure of government 
spending, penalties for corruption, judicial rules interpreting statutes 
against any apparent official self-dealing, and the like.  
The possibility of arranging other government rules to maximize the 
usefulness of hidden taxes leads me to one final point, that another avenue 
for future research opened by the analysis here lies in the area of 
institutional design. It is possible that some of the negative features of 
hidden taxes can be overcome with careful design of each tax instrument. 
For instance, while hidden taxes may make it difficult for citizens to 
consume their most-preferred level of public goods, this problem might be 
overcome by disclosing the exact amount and incidence of a jurisdiction’s 
tax alternatives to voters without identifying the precise source of the 
funds. To make hidden taxes more transparent and participatory, the 
administrators of hidden taxes could include representative citizen panels 
or other forms of participatory, rather than electoral, oversight.
243
 These 
forms of ―transparency engineering‖ have their own complications and 
tradeoffs, including the potential for corruption and self-dealing.
244
 But if 
the welfare gains from hidden taxes are large enough, some experiment 
with non-traditional governance forms is likely worthwhile.  
F. Fixing What is Broken 
Even if further study ultimately concludes that hidden taxes overall 
reduce welfare, a close attention to their operation is important, because 
our current revenue system already results in many taxes that are largely or 
partially hidden.
245
 Tax-exclusive sales taxes and tolls, as we now know, 
 
 
 242. This point is similar to the argument that a reason to treat similar taxpayers similarly is that it 
makes it more difficult for politicians to favor their preferred interest group. See BRENNAN & 
BUCHANAN, supra note 17, at 45, 227. 
 243. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 316–38 (1998); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 
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both change taxpayer behavior.
246
 Many commentators believe that 
income tax withholding makes the income tax less visible, although there 
are no data to support that intuition as yet.
247
  
Suppose, then, that we wish to avoid hidden taxes. For example, 
suppose it turns out that hidden taxes increase the regressivity of the tax 
system, and that is an undesirable result. That finding would justify efforts 
either to make taxes more transparent or, if reengineering is 
impracticable,
248
 to adjust tax rates to offset the distributive effects of the 
tax system’s design. Perhaps the fact that we know some present taxes are 
hidden offers a stronger justification for greater transparency in 
government spending, along the lines I suggested in the last subpart. More 
dramatically, if hidden taxes are irremediably anti-democratic, and 
withholding hides taxes, we must decide whether our aversion to opacity 
is worth giving up the very substantial administrative and fraud-reducing 
benefits of withholding.
249
  
CONCLUSION 
It remains theoretically uncertain whether hidden taxes can increase 
welfare. Taxes with low salience can diminish deadweight losses from 
taxation. At the same time, shrouding taxes from consumers may result in 
inefficient allocation of scarce dollars, including inefficient choices about 
where to live and which public officials to entrust with public funds. If 
hidden taxes prove to be regressive, that would further diminish overall 
welfare. Furthermore, taxpayers may, but probably will not, anticipate that 
there will be hidden taxes. And while some individuals can learn to 
recognize a hidden tax, others will struggle to obtain feedback or forget 
the lessons of the past.  
While there remains a need for further empirical work, my analysis 
here has identified several key questions upon which that work should 
focus. The foremost of these is whether or how often the diminished 
behavioral response to a hidden tax is a deliberate choice on the part of 
most taxpayers. As I have explained, that question’s answer in turn will 
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determine whether hidden taxes can be ―scaled up‖ to raise large portions 
of a government’s revenues, as well as impacting the distributive effects of 
a given hidden tax. I expect to report the results of my own investigation 
of that question in future work. 
As a result, the largest policy debates that could be triggered by hidden 
taxes remain just over the horizon. But, considering the difficulty and 
importance of some of those questions, it seems a good idea to get a head 
start on how they should best be resolved. 
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